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CONTEMPLATING TIE SUCCESSIVE
PROSECUTION PHENOMENON IN THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM
ELIZABETH T. LEAR*
I. INTRODUCTION
The federal system presents a peculiarly complex successive pros-
ecution problem. The decentralized nature of the federal prosecu-
tion effort and the intricate interstate character of federal crimes may
conspire to produce a series of related prosecutions arising from a
common factual nucleus. Consider, for example, the procedural his-
tory of United States v. Koonce.' After mailing a package of
methamphetamine to a government informant in South Dakota,
Koonce was arrested at his home in Utah where authorities discovered
firearms and additional quantities of drugs.2 He was convicted on fed-
eral drug distribution charges in South Dakota and received a twenty-
year sentence which included enhancements for both the drugs and
guns confiscated in Utah.3
Apparently unsatisfied with the result, the United States con-
vened a second grand jury, this time in Utah, to consider the same
drug activity. The subsequent indictment charged Koonce with pos-
session with intent to distribute methamphetamine and with the ille-
gal possession of firearms. 4  Under the Federal Sentencing
Guidelines, 5 conviction on the distribution count could yield only a
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Florida. B.A. 1981, University of North Car-
olina at Chapel Hill; J.D. 1987, University of Michigan. I am deeply indebted to Frank
Allen, Charles Collier, Joel Friedman,Jerold Israel, Marc Miller, Michael Seigel, and Chris-
topher Slobogin for their comments on earlier drafts of this Article, and to Bryan Aylstock,
Deborah Ben-David, and Michael Winter for their outstanding research assistance.
I United States v. Koonce, 884 F.2d 349 (8th Cir. 1989).
2 Id. at 353.
Sid.
4 United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145, 1148 (10th Cir. 1991).
5 In 1984, Congress passed the Sentencing Reform Act, which created the United
States Sentencing Commission [hereinafter the Commission] to design sentencing guide-
lines for the federal courts. See Sentencing Reform Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. §§ 3551-3586
(1988); 28 U.S.C. §§ 991-998 (1988). The resulting Guidelines became law on 1 November
1987. See FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL 1, UNITED STATES SENTENCING COMM'N
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concurrent sentence, while a conviction on the gun charge could add
five years to an already extensive prison term.6
Though all three offenses could legally have been prosecuted in
Utah,7 the two United States Attorneys involved declined to consoli-
date the prosecution. Neither the double jeopardy clause nor federal
statute required joinder, and splitting the case allowed both districts
to take credit for the investigation and prosecution. Yet, federal tax
dollars supported two grand juries, numerous prosecutors and federal
defenders, and lengthy court proceedings.
The Koonce case provides a relatively clean example of piece-
meal prosecution,8 which this Article defines as the successive prose-
cution of legally distinct offenses premised upon the same set of
factual circumstances. Although the decision to split the Koonce
prosecution appears to have been "politically" motivated, other factors
such as venue problems, investigative difficulties, and offense com-
plexity more likely explain the bulk of piecemeal prosecution in the
federal system. The frequency with which federal prosecutors engage
in piecemeal prosecution is unclear. In today's climate, however, even
limited multi-district reprosecution may be an unaffordable luxury.
The ever-expanding criminal docket is rapidly crowding out legiti-
mate civil litigation,9 overloading prosecutors and defenders, and
stretching the federal bench to the limit.
Constitutional scholars have long debated the relative merits of a
conduct-based compulsory joinder rule.10 The dialogue has centered
on the meaning of the "same offence" language of the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause, concentrating specifically on whether it includes the fac-
tual circumstances giving rise to criminal liability or applies only to
(1994-95) [hereinafter U.S.S.G.] (referred to throughout this article as the "Guidelines").
6 See Koonce 945 F.2d at 1155. On the case's third trip to the court of appeals, the
Tenth Circuit held that the reprosecution of the drug offense violated the Double Jeop-
ardy Clause. The court allowed the gun count to stand. See note 88, infra. For an in depth
discussion of the doublejeopardy decision, see Elizabeth T. Lear, Double Jeopardy, the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, and the Subsequent Prosecution Dilemma, 60 BRooK. L. Rav. 725 (1994).
7 The distribution prosecution in South Dakota technically originated in Utah. The
crime was therefore subject to prosecution in either venue. See 18 U.S.C. § 3732(a) (1988).
8 For the purposes of this Article, piecemeal prosecution, also referred to as successive,
redundant, or duplicative prosecution, refers to separate adjudications of separate statu-
tory offenses which arise from a common factual nucleus. This Article concentrates almost
entirely on redundant prosecution occurring in the multi-district or multi-venue context,
rather than reprosecution in a single district.
9 See infra notes 90 to 118 and accompanying text.
10 See, e.g., Comment, Twice in Jeopardy, 74YA.E L.J. 262, 296 (1965); Otto Kirchheimer,
The Act, the Offense and Double Jeopardy, 58 YALE LJ. 513, 534-42 (1949); Note, The Double
Jeopardy Clause as a Bar to ReintroducingEvidenc, 89 YALE LJ. 962, 967-70 (1980); George C.
Thomas III, The Prohibition of Successive Prosecutions for the Same Offense: In Search of a Defini-
tion, 71 IowA L. Rv. 324, 377-80 (1986).
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the statutory offenses charged." Recently, however, the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Dixon,12 abandoned as "unworkable" a limited
conduct-based approach it had fashioned just three years before in
Grady v. Corbin.13
The Court is unlikely to embrace anything approaching a transac-
tion-based offense definition in the near future. 14 Thus, it may be
worthwhile to refocus the discussion away from constitutional defini-
tions and purposes, and toward a meaningful policy analysis. Talking
about successive prosecution in terms of costs and benefits has an ad-
vantage over constitutional debate. Instead of beginning with the
Double Jeopardy Clause and fashioning a consistently applied rule to
protect its purposes, this approach accounts for special problems cre-
ated by increasingly complex federal prosecutions, concerns about ef-
ficiency, and fears that justice might suffer under a compulsory
joinder regime.
This Article revisits the "transaction" rule debate in the context of
a hypothetical statutoryjoinder requirement for the federal system. 15
Section II considers the sources of repeat prosecution in the federal
arena, the impact of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines on
prosecutorial charging behavior, and the costs traditionally attributed
to successive prosecution. Section III examines the arguments in
favor of and against a statutorily-imposed compulsory joinder ap-
proach, questioning whether either the definitional uncertainties of a
transaction rule or the political benefits of the current approach are
worth the individual and systemic costs inherent in an unchecked rep-
11 See, e.g., Comment, supra note 10, at 267-77; Kirchheimer, supra note 10, at 534-42;
Note, supra note 10, at 963-69; Thomas, supra note 10, passim.
12 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993).
1 495 U.S. 508 (1990). Under the Grady standard, doublejeopardy bars a subsequent
prosecution, "if, to establish an essential element of an offense charged in that prosecu-
tion, the government will prove conduct that constitutes an offense for which the defend-
ant has already been prosecuted." Id. at 510.
14 See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860 ("'same-conduct' rule ... is wholly inconsistent with
earlier Supreme Court precedent and with the clear common-law understanding of double
jeopardy").
15 The "transaction" approach discussed in this Article is not specific; this Article uses
"transaction" as a generic term referring to a factually driven inquiry forjoinder purposes,
as opposed to an approach like that employed under the Double Jeopardy Clause which
concentrates on the elements of the offenses. A classic example of a transaction based
compulsory joinder rule is one that Justice Brennan advocated in Ashe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436,453-54 (1970) (Brennan,J., concurring), which would require prosecutors tojoin
all offenses arising from a "single criminal act, occurrence, episode, or transaction." This
Article discusses more limited approaches, such as the conduct-formula embraced by the
Court in Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990), and more expansive proposals, such as
one requiring inclusion of all joinable offenses "which substantially overlap" in a single
indictment, see Comment, supra note 10, at 298, under the rubric of the "transaction"
approach.
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rosecution power. Section IV offers preliminary observations on is-
sues that must be resolved if compulsory joinder of any variety is to
succeed in the federal environment.
Two points require clarification. First, this Article does not assess
the frequency with which federal authorities prosecute joinable of-
fenses separately. While such information ultimately is necessary to
determine the absolute dollar costs of repeat prosecution, this Article
concentrates on the opportunities to abuse power that the current
approach leaves open to federal prosecutors. In addition, this Article
does not precisely define the "transaction rule." The purpose of this
Article is not to offer yet another definition of the criminal transac-
tion, but to explore the implications of imposing any compulsoryjoin-
der requirement on the federal system. Thus, the "transaction rule"
discussed herein generically denotes a factually-driven joinder re-
quirement that might range in scope from the conduct formula em-
braced in Grady v. Corbin'6 to a sweeping mandate that prosecutors
include all joinable offenses "which substantially overlap" in a single
indictment. 17
II. REDUNDANT PROSECUTION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
The federal criminal justice system operates with few limits on
duplicative litigation. Although the Double Jeopardy Clause prohibits
reprosecution of the "same offence," the successive prosecution pro-
tection is extremely narrow.' 8 As long as "each offense contains an
16 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508, 510 (1990).
17 Comment, supra note 10, at 298.
18 Under traditional analysis, the Double Jeopardy Clause encompasses two separate,
but related doctrines. It prohibits multiple punishment and multiple trials for the same
offense. See Kenneth G. Schuler, Note, Continuing Criminal Enterprise, Conspiracy and the
Multiple Punishment Doctrine, 91 MicH. L. Ruv. 2220, 2223 (1993); George C. Thomas III, An
Elegant Theory of Double Jeopardy, 1988 ILL L. REv. 827, 830 (1989). This Article focuses
entirely on the multiple trials, or successive prosecution, prohibition. The Blockburger
test governs the multiple trials prong, Dixon, 113 S. Ct at 2860, authorizing successive
prosecutions of separate statutory offenses if each offense "requires proof of a fact which
the other does not." Blockburger v. United States, 284 U.S. 299, 304 (1932).
The multiple punishment inquiry has generally focused on congressional intent. See
Missouri v. Hunter, 459 U.S. 359, 368-69 (1983). Under this analysis, even offenses which
would technically be the same under the Blockburger test may draw cumulative punish-
ment if prosecuted in one proceeding. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2883 (Souter,J., concurring
and dissenting). Thus, multiple punishment may be allowed for some offenses for which
multiple trials would be forbidden under the Double Jeopardy Clause. In addition, a col-
lateral estoppel component of double jeopardy theoretically provides some additional suc-
cessive prosecution protection. Facts once litigated, which are essential to the initial
judgment, may not be reconsidered at a subsequent proceeding. SeeAshe v. Swenson, 397
U.S. 436, 443 (1970). The general verdict in criminal cases undermines the potency of
collateral estoppel in the criminal context. In most cases, it is impossible to determine
upon what fact the jury rested its verdict, or whether it engaged in nullification. Thus, in
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element not contained in the other" 19 separate prosecutions of the
factually related offenses are constitutionally acceptable. This ap-
proach concentrates on the statutory offense rather than the underly-
ing factual scenario. Thus, a single sale of drugs may constitutionally
give rise to a series of federal prosecutions for offenses ranging from
distributing drugs within one hundred feet of a video arcade facility20
and using a telephone in connection with a drug transaction,21 to
knowingly providing drugs to a pregnant woman.22 And the prolifera-
tion of federal statutes criminalizing all aspects of a single course of
conduct has only exacerbated the potential for duplicative
prosecution.23
No federal statutory orjudicially created mechanism supplements
the double jeopardy protection. The Federal Rules of Criminal Proce-
dure permit liberaljoinder of offenses, 24 but do not requirejoinder in
any instance. Nor have the federal courts embraced a common law or
prudential compulsory joinder requirement beyond that which the
Double Jeopardy Clause provides.
The only significant constraint on reprosecution in the federal
system comes from an internal Justice Department policy which offi-
cially discourages more than one prosecution based on "the same act,
acts or transaction."2 Section 9-2.142 of the United States Attorney's
Manual sets forth the "Dual Prosecution and Successive Federal Prose-
cution Policies" of the Department of Justice.2 6 Often referred to as
the vast majority of successive prosecutions, collateral estoppel does not impede the gov-
ernment's ability to contest facts litigated in the initial proceeding and provides no useful
constraints on duplicative prosecutions. See Note, supra note 10, at 971-74.
19 This formula is called the Blockburger test because it originated in Blockburger, 284
U.S. at 304. The Court in Dixon officially embraced the Blockburger test in the successive
trials context. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860.
20 21 U.S.C. § 860(a) (Supp. V 1993).
21 21 U.S.C. § 843(b) (1988).
22 21 U.S.C. § 861(f) (Supp. V 1993).
23 As the Supreme Court pointed out in Ashe v. Swenson, there has been an "extraordi-
nary proliferation of overlapping and related statutory offenses." 397 U.S. 436, 445 n.10
(1970); see Thomas, supra note 10, at 374. Professor Thomas' hypothetical involving an
astonishing series of overlapping statutes in the RICO context aptly illustrates this point.
See id. at 1371-87.
24 FED. R. GRIM. P. 8(a) provides:
Two or more offenses may be charged in the same indictment or information in a
separate count for each offense if the offenses charged, whether felonies or misde-
meanors or both, are of the same or similar character or are based on the same act or
transaction or on two or more acts or transactions connected together or constituting
parts of a common scheme or plan.
Id.
2 UNrrED STATES ArroRNa s' MANUAL 9-2.142(A)(3) (1995) [hereinafter U.S.A.M.
(1995)].
26 The policy applies to federal prosecutions initiated after a successful state prosecu-
tion ("dual prosecution") and federal prosecutions initiated after the completion of an-
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the Petite Policy because it was first announced in Petite v. United
States,27 Section 9-2.142 theoretically limits federal prosecutors in the
exercise of their discretion to initiate prosecution of federal crimes.2 8
It prohibits successive prosecutions in the absence of a "compelling
federal interest."2 In addition, the policy forbids a district from initi-
ating a subsequent prosecution in the absence of express authoriza-
tion from an Assistant Attorney General.30  To obtain such
authorization, the district must generally submit proof that the prior
"proceeding left substantial federal interests demonstrably unvindi-
cated" and that the proposed prosecution will likely yield a more ex-
tensive sentence.3'
Although the Petite Policy appears to have substantial bite, the
scope of the interests considered potentially "compelling" and the
wide range of instances which warrant reprosecution leave the federal
reprosecution power almost entirely intact. The policy requires iden-
tification of "substantial federal interests" on a case-by-case basis, yet
goes on to state that "cases coming within priority areas of the Depart-
ment-such as civil rights cases, organized crime cases, tax cases, fire-
arms cases, and cases involving crimes against federal officials,
witnesses or informants-are, of course more likely to meet the com-
pelling federal interest requirement."32 The policy also recognizes
that a "subsequent prosecution may... be warranted where there is a
substantial basis for believing that" prosecutorial, judicial, or jury ac-
tions in the initial proceeding were affected by any of the following:
"incompetence, corruption, intimidation, undue influence," judicial
or "jury nullification," or the unavailability of evidence "either because
it was not timely discovered or because it was suppressed on an erro-
neous view of the law."3 3 Perhaps most importantly, the policy does
not preclude reprosecution of charges that could not have been in-
cluded in the original prosecution, 34 such as closely connected crimes
other federal action ("successive prosecution"). Id. This Article is concerned only with
successive federal prosecution.
27 361 U.S. 529, 530 (1960).
28 See Rinaldi v. United States, 434 U.S. 22, 27 (1977).
29 U.SAM. (1995), supra note 25, at 9-2-142(A); see also United States v. Thompson, 579
F.2d 1184, 1191 (10th Cir. 1978); Gerald A. Feffer, Criminal Tax Investigations, C254 AL-
ABA 1, 26-28 (1988).
30 See U.SAM. (1995), supra note 25, at 9-2.142 (A).
31 See U.SAM. (1995), supra note 25, at 9-2.142(A) (2) (b) & (A)(3).
32 Id. at n.8.
33 Id.
34 The Petite Policy specifically exempts situations in which prosecutors could have
joined the offenses charged in the second prosecution with those charged in the first:
"The successive federal prosecution policy does not apply and authorization need not be
obtained where the second or subsequent prosecution could not have been brought to-
gether with the initial federal prosecution of the defendant." U.SAM. (1995), supra note
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excluded from the first indictment on venue grounds. Thus, the Pe-
tite Doctrine has only limited applicability to classic multi-venue situa-
tions, to a vast array of priority prosecutions such as drugs and
firearms, and to cases in which the Department of Justice questions
the wisdom or accuracy of a prior verdict or sentence.35
A. SOURCES OF REPEAT PROSECUTION IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Successive prosecution in the federal system36 is probably best de-
scribed as an inter-district rather than intra-district phenomenon.
Both the Petite Policy and resource allocation decisions likely discour-
age intra-district reprosecution. Particularly in cases ending in acquit-
tal, a single district has little incentive to rededicate resources3 7 to a
second prosecution which may yield the same result as the first prose-
cution. Moreover, prosecutors in a particular district consistently ap-
pear before the same judges. The relationship between the federal
judiciary and the U.S. Attorneys' Offices is an important one, and the
bench, understandably, is hostile to the use of precious judicial re-
sources to rehash events already litigated.
On an inter-district level, however, the structure of the federal
prosecution effort may encourage duplicative litigation. The next sev-
eral subsections consider the characteristics which seem most likely to
generate redundant prosecution.
1. The Structure of the Federal Prosecution Effort
The federal approach to criminal prosecution is decidedly decen-
tralized. Though this structure ideally produces a prosecution strat-
egy responsive to particular concerns of a given district,38 it may
25, at 9-2.142 (A) (2) (b).
35 Moreover, because it is a federal prosecutorial policy, not a matter of constitutional
law, see United States v. Booth, 673 F.2d 27, 30 (1st Cir. 1982), it creates no enforceable
right for the accused. See United States v. Harrison, 918 F.2d 469, 475 (5th Cir. 1990);
Booth, 673 F.2d at 30 (the "doctrine does not create a ... right in the accused"); United
States v. Thompson, 579 F.2d 1184, 1189 (10th Cir. 1978) (characterizing the notion that a
departmental policy is capable of giving rise to an enforceable right as "ill-founded").
36 This Article makes no attempt to assess the pervasiveness of the successive prosecu-
tion problem in the federal arena. Such an effort would ideally involve an empirical study
well beyond the scope of its undertaking.
37 See infra Part I.C.
38 SeeJAmEs ESENSTErN, COUNSEL FOR THE UNrrr STATES 6 (1978) (stating that differ-
ences in the composition of the districts' geographic location, population, economies, and
political environments produce diverse characteristics and behavior). For example, dis-
tricts located in Southern and Border states prosecute the most defendants charged with
illegally distilling alcohol, while the districts which contain the chief financial centers, such
as the Southern District of New York, handle most of the corporate fraud cases. Id. Fur-
thermore, the internal organizational schemes vary widely among the districts as each is
organized to meet its own specialized needs. Id.
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exacerbate existing tendencies for repeat prosecution. United States
Attorneys have traditionally operated with almost complete auton-
omy.39 Even today the Justice Department rarely interferes in the
charging decisions of local offices. 4° For the most part, the local of-
fices initiate investigations and pursue prosecutions with little if any
central oversight.4 ' Thus, if prosecuting a particular offense is consis-
39 When the first Congress authorized the appointment of U.S. Attorneys in the judici-
ary Act of 1789, it did not establish a supervisory authority for U.S. Attorneys. EISENSTEIN,
supra note 38, at 9; DANiL J. MEADOR, THE PRESIDENT, THE AroR, EY GENERAL, AND THE
DEPARTMENT OF JusTICE 6 (1980). The U.S. Attorneys could maintain private practices,
received their compensation by taking a percentage of fees and recoveries, and could rep-
resent the federal government as they wished. EISENSTEIN, supra note 38, at 9-10. The first
official grant of supervisory power over the U.S. Attorneys did not come until 1830, when a
bill introduced by Senator Daniel Webster became law. MEADOR, supa, at 7. The law em-
powered the Solicitor of the Treasury to instruct the U.S. Attorneys in all matters which
interested the United States. Id.; Act of May 29, 1830, Ch. 153, 4 Stat. 414 (1830).
Although the law gave the U.S. Attorneys official supervision, they remained almost com-
pletely autonomous, and no effective means for nationwide coordination between the U.S.
Attorneys existed before the advent of the Civil War. MEADOR, supra, at 9. It was not until
1870, when Congress established the Department of Justice, that the Attorney General
gained any formal power to review the decisions of a U.S. Attorney. See Act of June 22,
1870, ch. 150, §§ 3, 15-16, 16 Stat. 162, 164 (corresponds to 28 U.S.C. §§ 518-519, 543
(1970). For a discussion of the history of the office of the Attorney General, see MEADOR,
supra, at 4-13; Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney Genera" The Federal Government's Chief Law and
Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FoPDHAm L. REV. 1049, 1050-57 (1978).
40 Harold H. Bruff, Independent Counsel and the Constitution, 24 WILLAMETrE L REV. 539,
559 (1988). TheJustice Department has made some attempts to bring consistency to fed-
eral prosecution through the use of a computerized reporting system and by distributing
the Principles of Federal Prosecution, a handbook printed for U.S. Attorneys' offices. John
Dombrink & James W. Meeker, Racketeering Prosecution: The Use and Abuse of RICO, 16
RuTGERs UJ., 633, 640-41 (1985). The effectiveness of Principles of Federal Prosecution in
achieving uniform guidelines is undermined by its explicit authorization for the U.S. Attor-
neys to modify the principles as appropriate. Id. at 642. Furthermore, U.S. Attorneys can
manipulate the computerized statistics generated at the Justice Department by controlling
the information made available to the Department. See EISENSTEIN, supra note 38, at 80.
U.S. Attorneys also employ other strategies and tactics to thwart attempts by the Justice
Department to exercise its authority. For example, a federal prosecutor can circumvent
the need for department approval to dismiss an indictment by tacitly or openly asking the
judge to dismiss it. Id. at 85. Another effective technique prosecutors use is to stall. Id. at
84. Because the Department recognizes that an attorney's lack of enthusiasm for a particu-
lar case will reduce the level of attention it gets, and thus reduce the chances for success,
the department may not insist on prosecuting the case. Id.
Some commentators have concluded that the substantial autonomy of the U.S. Attor-
neys' offices militates against the Justice Department imposing any effective and efficient
external controls on those offices. See EisENSTEIN, supra note 38, at 123; Richard S. Frase,
The Decision to File Federal Criminal Charges: A Quantitative Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 47
U. CHI. L. REv. 246, 248-49 (1980).
41 The Department of Justice does exert control over some classes of investigations.
For instance, the Department clears all RICO prosecutions. See U.S.A.M. (1995), supra
note 25, at 9-110.101 ("No RICO criminal indictment or information or civil complaint
shall be filed, and no civil investigative demand shall be issued, without the prior approval
of the Criminal Division."). The Department also requires approval from Washington
before the dismissal of an indictment. EISENSTEIN, supra note 38, at 88. In addition, anec-
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tent with district goals, the fact that the United States has elsewhere
prosecuted the defendant for a related offense may be of little
interest.
The Justice Department's emphasis on objective indicia of pro-
ductivity probably contributes more to any successive prosecution
problem than does the sheer number of United States Attorney's of-
fices. 42 Productivity in prosecutor-speak means convictions, and the
Department of Justice requires offices to report overall prosecution
and conviction information. 43 Although the statistics have no official
significance, the Department of Justice publishes them and undoubt-
edly considers them in assessing the budgetary needs of its offices. 44
The quality of the convictions may therefore matter less than the
quantity; it does not appear that a central authority at the Department
of Justice determines whether reported convictions involve defend-
ants already prosecuted in another district 4 5 Because a defendant al-
ready convicted of a related offense is a much easier plea bargain
target,46 a subsequent prosecution may be a reasonably easy way to
increase productivity.47
dotal information suggests that the Department will occasionally intervene to resolve dis-
putes between districts regarding jurisdiction to pursue a particular investigation or
prosecution.
42 There are currently 94 United States Attorneys. See THE U.S. GovE nM smEr MANUAL
1993/94, at 370-72 (1994); David Luban, Are Criminal Defenders Different?, 91 MICH. L. Rv.
1729, 1731 n.11 (1993).
43 The Department ofJustice collects and compiles statistical data in convenient form.
U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STAT'rSICS (Kathleen Maguire et
al., eds., 1993). The Department collects statistics on the type of crime, manner of disposi-
tion, sentence length, time from filing to disposition, and most importantly, conviction
rate.
44 The Department of Justice uses its tight control over expenditures as an important
check on the U.S. Attorneys. JAMEs EismSTns , COUNSEL FOR THE UNrrED STATES: AN EM-
rnucAL ANALsis OF THE OmcE OF UNrrED STATES A-roRNEY IV-22 (1968). The budget
staff of the Department of'Justice's Office of the Controller is responsible for department-
wide budget formulation and execution functions. 1984 ATr'Y GiN. ANN. REP. 22. The
staff controls appropriations, reimbursements, employment ceilings, outlays, and other
legal or administrative limitations pursuant to congressional or OMB directives. Id.
45 Cf. U.SAM. (1995), supra note 25, at 9-2.142(A) (a) (admonishing U.S. Attorney's
offices to "make a reasonable effort to determine whether there are related federal pro-
ceedings pending before initiating new federal proceedings").
46 Because in many cases a second but related prosecution will yield only a concurrent
sentence under the guidelines, see U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5G1.3(b), a defendant's incen-
tive to contest the subsequent indictment may be low. See infra text accompanying notes 80
to 81. Even in cases in which a second conviction will extend defendant's sentence, the
prosecutorial advantages derived from the first trial and the likelihood that the defendant
will not take the stand due to the related conviction, seeFED. R. EVID. 404(b), may induce a
guilty plea.
47 In fact, because conviction rates are the primary criterion for excellence that the
individual districts use, a defendant's previous conviction on a related offense may increase
the likelihood of successive prosecution. SeeRobert L. Rabin, Agency Criminal Referrals in the
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In addition, the emphasis on statistics may encourage districts to
divide up the prosecution of related offenses.48 In coordinated inves-
tigations the prosecutors, as well as the DEA and FBI agents on whom
they depend, need to obtain "credit" for the resources expended on
the investigation. 49 Equitably splitting the prosecutorial duties be-
tween cooperating districts ensures that they receive the appropriate
credit and that their personal efforts are recognized. 50
Political forces also play a role in the successive prosecution puz-
zle. More than one United States Attorney has harbored political am-
bitions.51 High-profile prosecutions provide a unique and generally
Federal System: An Empirical Study of Prosecutorial Discretion, 24 STAN. L. REV. 1036, 1045
(1972). There exists a certain sense of interdistrict rivalry to obtain the highest conviction
rate, and this desire to be the "best" may spark a desire in the U.S. Attorneys' offices to
obtain as many sure-fire convictions as possible for any given offense. See id.
48 The Petite Policy specifically states that it "does not generally permit the dividing of a
single criminal transaction for separate prosecution within the same or different judicial
districts." U.SAM. (1995), supra note 25, at 9-2.142 (A) (1)(b). Artful pleading, for in-
stance, not charging a continuing offense which can be prosecuted in two districts, may
avoid this problem. Some cases, such as United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir.
1991), suggest that prosecutors ignore this aspect of the Petite Policy. In addition, the
broad scope of interests considered "compelling" under the Petite Policy, see supra notes
31-36, may generate fragmented prosecutions. Also, the policy does not define the terms
"act" and "transaction;" a narrow view of the "transaction" may allow districts to share a
prosecution. See U.SA.M. (1995), supra note 25, at 9-2.142.
49 Anecdotal information from former Assistant U.S. Attorneys suggests that a convic-
tion in the district allows the agents to "take a stat" (i.e., to close the file). Undoubtedly,
some very understandable team emotion (beyond the mere interest in obtaining credit)
accounts for the desire to see the defendant convicted by prosecutors with whom the
agents have worked closely in their home district
50 This may explain the two prosecutions described in the introduction. In United
States v. Koonce, the investigation involved agents in both Utah and South Dakota. See
United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145, 1147 (10th Cir. 1991). The interception of the
package, and the negotiation for cooperation of the customer occurred in South Dakota.
While an undercover investigation, and the arrest and search took place in Utah. Id.
51 New York City Mayor Rudolph Giuliani, the former United States Attorney for the
Southern District of New York, is particularly well-known for using his position for political
gain. See Connie Bruck, Rudolph Giu/iani, AM. LAw., March 1989, at 99. His most famous
exploit was outside the prosecution context when he and Senator Alphonse D'Amato (R -
New York) donned army-surplus caps, designer sunglasses, and Hell's Angels jackets and
were driven by drug-enforcement agents to Washington Heights in upper Manhattan to
demonstrate the ease with which one may buy crack cocaine. Your Tax Dollars at Work,
NEWSWEEK, July 21, 1986, at 66. Giuliani's office was responsible for a number of high-
profile insider trading cases, including one in which he ordered the authorities to arrest
and cuff executives at Goldman Sachs & Co. and Kidder Peabody & Co at their offices "as if
they were most-wanted desperados about to leave to flee the country." Richard B. Stolly,
The Ordeal of Bob Freeman, FORTUNE, May 25, 1987, at 66; Curtis Wilkie, Prosecutor Seeks New
N.Y. Spotlight; Some Pans Mix with the Raves as Giuliani Covets Mayoralty, BOSTON GLOBE,
March 21, 1989, at 1. The press criticized Giuliani's actions as unnecessarily harsh and
publicity seeking. See, e.g., Stolly, supra, at 66; Paul Richter, Rudolph W. Giuliani; Crime
Buster Finds Image is on Trial, LA TimEs, March 27, 1987, § 1, at 1. ("These people can't
resist those cameras; they have to make every bust a miniseries." (quoting the former chair-
man of the U.S. Commodities Futures Trading Commission)). Although the office touted
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positive opportunity to gain public recognition. Though incentives to
reprosecute for political gain arise only occasionally, the temptation
may be substantial. This phenomenon is not restricted to the mul-
tidistrict reprosecution scenario; the desire to appear "tough on
crime" may also invite this sort of resource allocation in a single office.
2. Venue
Because federal offenses target interstate criminal activity, the
prosecution often confronts joinder problems generated by constitu-
tional venue requirements.52 Article III and the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial 53 limit the trial to the state in which the offense oc-
curred54 and specifically guarantee the accused ajury drawn from the
district in which the crime was committed.5 5 And unlike many proce-
dural prerequisites to trial, courts do not presume that venue is cor-
rect;5 6 the prosecution must prove it at trial.57 Thus, even where Rule
8 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure permits consolidation,
constitutional venue problems may force offense splitting.58
the arrests, it dismissed the indictments against the three men three months later. The Case
That Won't Vanish- Ex-prosecutor Giuliani and the Wall Street Thre, NEWSDAY, March 21, 1989,
at 54. In addition, anecdotal information suggests that Giuliani's office was particularly
difficult to work with due to his political ambitions. See Bruck, supra, at 99.
52 See Norman Abrams, Conspirazy and Multi-Venue in Federal Criminal Prosecutions: The
Crime Committed Formula, 9 UCLA L. REv. 751, 752 (1962); Comment, Multi-Venue and the
Obscenity Statutes, 115 U. PA. L. Rxv. 399, 399 (1967).
53 Technically, Article III establishes "venue" by requiring that the government try the
defendant in the "State in which the Crime was committed." U.S. CONs'. art. I. The
Sixth Amendment, on the other hand, sets forth ajury composition, or vicinage, require-
ment. Instead of insisting that-the trial be in a particular place, the Sixth Amendment
requires that the jury come from a particular place-the "district in which the crime was
committed." U.S. CONsr. amend VI. For the purposes of this Article, the distinction is not
important. For a more detailed discussion of the differences between venue and vicinage,
see WAvN LAFAVE &JEROLD ISRAEL, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 737-41 (2d ed. 1992).
54 Article Ill of the United States Constitution states: "The trial of all Crimes, except in
Cases of Impeachment, shall be byJury and such Trial shall be held in the State where the
said Crimes shall have been committed...." U.S. CoNST. art. III, § 2, cl. 3.
55 The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution provides in pertinent part:
"In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and public trial,
by an impartial jury of the State and district wherein the crime shall have been committed
.... " U.S. CoNsT. amend. VI.
56 Other prerequisites, such as a valid preliminary hearing bindover, are assumed to be
present in the absence of a defense showing to the contrary. Id. at 746.
57 Although the federal courts do not treat venue as a material element of the crime,
they do require that "the facts supporting venue be established by a preponderance of the
evidence." Id.
58 United States v. McCormick, 993 F.2d 1012 (2d Cir. 1992), provides a good example
of venue-driven case splitting. John McCormick engaged in a series of fraudulent transac-
tions with banks in Vermont and Connecticut. Id. at 1013. The transactions were related
in that the same fraudulent documents were presented at each bank to obtain the loans
and the same individuals assisted McCormick in his crimes. Id. Federal grand juries in
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Although a defendant may waive venue, and there is no legal im-
pediment to joining an offense for which venue is lacking in a single
indictment,59 the incentive to coordinate with another district in this
manner may be low. The threat of prosecution in another district is
an excellent way to coerce the recalcitrant defendant into a plea
agreement. Moreover, thejoinder of offenses for which venue is lack-
ing may be considered poaching in light of the conviction rate con-
sciousness discussed above.60 And including counts for which venue is
absent may be risky. Although the federal courts have generally held
that when venue is patently absent, the defendant's failure to object
before trial constitutes waiver,6 ' even this standard requires the gov-
Connecticut and later Vermont returned separate indictments charging the various bank-
ing offenses. Id. Had the crimes been committed wholly within one of the states, all of-
fenses could have been joined in a single indictment. Instead, the Connecticut charges
proceeded to trial first. McCormick was convicted on all counts, and at sentencing, the
conduct forming the basis for the Vermont charges was used to enhance McCormick's
sentence. After he was sentenced, the government proceeded with the charges in Ver-
mont. Id.
The Vermont prosecution may also have been motivated by a desire to obtain restitu-
tion for the victims of the Vermont frauds. See id. at 444 (Mahoney, J., concurring and
dissenting) ("restitution could not be imposed in the Connecticut prosecution for Ver-
mont Frauds not charged there"). A footnote in the Petite Policy suggests that victim resti-
tution might provide a sufficient basis for a second prosecution. See U.S.AM. (1995), supra
note 25, at 9-2.142(A) (3) at n.8.
59 The U.S. Attorneys' Manual technically prohibits presenting offenses for which
venue is lacking to the grandjury. U.SA.M. (1995), supra note 25, at 9-11.121. "Neverthe-
less, it is common for a grand jury to investigate matters occurring at least partly outside its
own district. ... [A] grand jury is under no obligation to determine venue early in its
investigation." Id.
60 See supra notes 42 to 46 and accompanying text.
61 E.g., United States v. Systems Architects, 757 F.2d 373, 378 (1st Cir. 1985) (venue
waived if not objected to prior to trial when defendant aware of alleged defect since filing
of indictment); United States v. Levasseur, 816 F.2d 37, 45 (2d Cir. 1987) (indictment gave
clear notice of venue defects, therefore appellants waived objection to venue by failing to
raise it before trial); United States v. Turley, 891 F.2d 57, 61 (3d Cir. 1989) (defendants
waive objection to venue if they do not raise it in a timely manner. "Timeliness is viewed as
'at least prior to the close of the government's case... and perhaps before the trial be-
gins.'") (quoting United States v. Polin, 323 F.2d 549, 577 (3d Cir. 1963)); United States v.
Melia, 741 F.2d 70, 71 (4th Cir. 1984) ("rule that the objection must be made before trial
applies.., when the defect is apparent on the face of the indictment."); United States v.
Dryden, 423 F.2d 1175, 1178 (5th Cir. 1970) ("Defects relating to venue are waived unless
asserted prior to trial."); Harper v. United States, 383 F.2d 795, 795 (5th Cir. 1967)
("waiver ensues where the objection to venue is not lodged prior to trial."); United States v.
McMaster, 343 F.2d 176, 181 (6th Cir.) (venue waived if not challenged prior to verdict),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 818 (1965); United States v. Bohle, 445 F.2d 54, 58-59 (7th Cir. 1971)
(where "improper venue is apparent on the face of the indictment, it has been uniformly
held that the objection [to venue] is waived if not presented before the close of the Gov-
ernment's case and perhaps if not presented before commencement of trial."); United
States v. Haley, 500 F.2d 302, 305 (8th Cir. 1974) (stating "[t]here is a vast amount of
circuit court authority supporting our view that appellant's attack upon venue comes too
late."); Gilbert v. United States, 359 F.2d 285, 288 (9th Cir.) (venue waived where defend-
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emiment to proceed somewhat uncertainly, never knowing- if the de-
fendant will object at the eleventh hour, resulting in a waste of
valuable time spent in trial preparation. 62
3. Nature of Federal Crimes
The increasingly intricate character of federal offenses, such as
RICO and Conspiracy, also generates a certain degree of redundancy.
Conspiracy prosecutions, although not involving a technically "com-
plex" offense, often produce a series of related prosecutions. 63 Jury
confusion inherent in the multi-defendant nature of the conspiracy
prosecution often militates against joining related conspiracies and
the underlying substantive offenses, particularly when many defend-
ants have unrelated substantive offenses alleged against them. Yet, a
second prosecution rehashes much of the factual information re-
viewed in the initial prosecution.
The successive prosecution problems in the RICO 64 context are
more extreme than those generated by conspiracy actions. RICO
"charges are generally based on allegations of criminal behavior ex-
tending over long periods of time, sometimes occurring in locations
ant makes specific motion to acquit at close of government's case without challenging
venue), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 882 (1966); United States v. Daniels, 986 F.2d 451, 453 n.2
(appellant waived objection to venue by failing to raise it prior to trial), modified, in part, on
reh, 5 F.3d 495, 496 (11th Cir. 1993) (finding that indictment contained a proper allega-
tion of venue so that defendant had no notice of a defect of venue until the Government
rested its case and thus the objection was timely when made at the close of the evidence-
but venue objection was without merit).
62 The government may be able to settle the matter fairly early in the pretrial period by
bringing the venue irregularity to the attention of the judge and asking the court to set a
time by which the defendant must object to venue. See FED. R. CruM. P. 12(b) (allowing
pretrial motions raising, inter alia, objections based on "defects in the institution of the
prosecution"); FED. R. CaLm. P. 12(c) (allowing the court to set a date by which defendants
must make all pretrial motions, unless a local rule otherwise provides).
63 See, e.g., United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1380 (1992) (Government prosecuted
substantive offense then obtained conspiracy indictment alleging that offense as an overt
act); United States v. Gambino, 729 F. Supp. 954, 959 (S.D.N.Y.), affid in part and rev'd in
part, remanded, 920 F.2d 1108 (2d Cir. 1990), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1657 (1992) (in light of
United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377 (1992)) (prosecution of two related conspiracies, the
second arguably encompassing the first); United States v. Calderone, 917 F.2d 717 (2d Cir.
1990), vacated, 112 S. Ct. 1637 (in light of United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1337 (1992))
(first attempt to convict for larger conspiracy was unsuccessful and was followed by a prose-
cution for a related but smaller conspiracy). For an in depth analysis of the double jeop-
ardy implications of repeated conspiracy prosecutions, see Anne B. Poulin, DoubleJeopardy
Protection Against Succesive Prosecutions in Complex Criminal Cases: A Mode4 25 CoNN. L. REV.
95, 117-30 (1992); see also Note, "Single vs. Multiple" Criminal Conspiracies: A Uniform Method
of Inquiry forDue Process and Double eopardy Purposes, 65 MrNN. L. Rxv. 295 (1981); Timothy
K. Coyne, Note, "Totality of Circumstances" Test Used in Conspiracy Defendants' Double Jeopardy
Cases, 33 ViaL. L. R-v. 674 (1988).
64 8 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988). RICO is shorthand for the Racketeer Influenced and
Corrupt Organizations Act. Id.
ELIZABETH T. LEAR
distant from one another and involving a long cast of criminal ac-
tors."65 The pattern of racketeering must be based upon specific
predicate acts supported by proof beyond a reasonable doubt.66 A
RICO investigation may spawn a dizzying sequence of prosecutions.
For example, according to Professor George Thomas, a defendant
who "conspires to take over a legitimate business that engages in inter-
state commerce" by committing a robbery, an extortion, an act of
bribery, and an act of mail fraud could be charged with at least nine
separate offenses, and subjected to seven consecutive trials.67
4. Newly Discovered Evidence
Newly discovered evidence often explains a subsequent prosecu-
tion based upon facts already litigated. Though the explanation is by
no means unique to the federal system, both the sheer size of the
system and the local character of the investigations may exacerbate
the extent to which new evidence accounts for subsequent prosecu-
tions. When ninety-four districts6s are independently assessing the
strength of evidence for internal prosecution decisions, evidence re-
lated to a prosecution in another district may be overlooked.
Although FBI and DEA agents, as well as Assistant United States Attor-
neys (AUSAs), often coordinate their investigations, the significance
of particular information may not be immediately obvious. Moreover,
subsequent decisions by witnesses to cooperate likely account for
much new evidence. And such cooperation may hinge upon a grant
65 Poulin, supra note 63, at 107.
66 The "government must prove beyond a reasonabe doubt that defendant has in fact com-
mitted ... the racketeering acts alleged .... and that predicate acts have some effect on
enterprise." United States v. Carlock, 806 F.2d 535, 546 (5th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 480
U.S. 949, 950 (1987) (emphasis added); see Poulin, supra note 63, at 107.
67 Professor George Thomas III uses this hypothetical to demonstrate dramatically the
inadequacy of the successive prosecution protection under the Blockburger test. See
George C. Thomas III, RICO Prosecutions and the Double Jeopardy/Multiple Punishment Problem,
78 Nw. U. L. Ruv. 1359, 1370-86 (1984). The hypothetical reads in its entirety: "X conspires
to take over a legitimate business that engages in interstate commerce; in achieving the
goal, X commits one robbery, one extortion, one act of bribery, and one act of mail fraud."
Id. at 1370. If one assumes that the defendant is charged with the following offenses
a substantive RICO violation (based on a pattern of racketeering activity involving the
bribery and the mail fraud); a RICO conspiracy; a conspiracy under the general fed-
eral conspiracy statute, section 371 alleging the bribery as the overt act of the conspir-
acy; a conspiracy under section 894(a) (conspiring to use extortion to collect an
extension of credit); a conspiracy under section 1951(a) (conspiring to use robbery to
affect interstate commerce); a substantive violation of 894(a) (using extortion to col-
lect an extension of credit); a substantive violation of section 1951 (a) (affecting inter-
state commerce by robbery); and a substantive bribery and mall fraud violation,
id. at 1370-71, an application of the Blockburger test authorizes seven separate federal
prosecutions. Id. at 1386.
68 There are currently 94 United States Attorneys, one for each district. See THE U.S.
GOVERNMENT MA uAL 1993/94, supra note 42, at 372 (1994).
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of immunity69 or a favorable plea bargain, which may, in turn, depend
upon prosecution decisions in another district.
5. Executive Enforcement Priorities
In some situations, the executive may make a conscious choice to
embrace a successive prosecution strategy. Consider, for example, the
Justice Department's deliberate abuse of the successive prosecution
power as part of its campaign against obscenity. After the publication
of the Report of the Attorney General's Commission on Pornogra-
phy,70 the Justice Department officially designated obscenity prosecu-
tions a major priority71 and formed the National Obscenity
Enforcement Unit (NOEU).72 Obscenity prosecutions were formally
exempted from the Petite Policy,73 and the NOEU actively pursued
prosecutions in multiple districts to coerce guilty pleas and bankrupt
defendants.74 Such a strategy in pornography enforcement is espe-
cially tempting because the federal obscenity laws treat every delivery
of obscene material as a separate offense.7 5 In cases involving na-
tional publications, prosecutions are theoretically possible in every
district.
This strategy is easy to export to other enforcement initiatives. It
is possible to dissect many crimes involving the use of the mails or
transportation in interstate commerce into an alarming number of in-
dividual offenses. The general federal venue statute allows prosecu-
tion of such offenses "in any district from, through, or into which such
commerce or mail matter moves," 76 thus vesting in the executive the
69 A formal offer of immunity requires the approval of an appropriate Assistant Attor-
ney General upon the United States Attorney's certification that "(1) the testimony or
other information from such individual may be necessary to the public interest; and (2)
such individual has refused or is likely to refuse to testify... on the basis of his privilege
against self-incrimination." 18 U.S.C. § 6003 (1994).
70 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, ArTORNEY GENERAL'S COMM'N ON PORNOGRAPHY, FINAL REPORT
(1986).
71 See Patrick Ingram, Note, Censorship by Multiple Prosecution: "Annihilation, by Attrition if
not Conviction," 77 Iowa L. REv. 269, 278, 285 (citing UNrrED STATES ArroRNm' MANUAL 9-
75.001 (1988) [hereinafter U.S.A.M. (1988)]).
72 Attorney General Edwin Meese inaugurated the National Obscenity Enforcement
Unit on 22 October 1986 pursuant to recommendation 12 of the report issued by the
Attorney General's Commission on Pornography. U.S.A.M. (1988), supra note 71, at 9-
2.142 (A) (3).
73 See U.SAM. (1988), supra note 71, at 9-75.310.
74 Ingram, supra note 71, at 269.
75 See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. §§ 1461-1465 (1988).
76 18 U.S.C. § 3237(a) (1994) provides:
Except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress, any offense
against the United States begun in one district and completed in another, or commit-
ted in more than one district, may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district in
which such offense was begun, continued, or completed.
1995]
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ability to use a successive prosecution strategy in a variety of
circumstances.
6. Inadequate Punishment
A major incentive to reinitiate a prosecution in any system is the
belief that the defendant has been inadequately punished. The Petite
Policy specifically notes that a second prosecution might be warranted
if a "substantial basis" exists for believing that prosecutorial incompe-
tence, or judge or jury nullification affected the verdict or the "sever-
ity of the sentence. 77 Thus, reprosecution remains a viable option to
the federal prosecutor who feels that the defendant's punishment was
insufficient.
B. THE RELATIONSHIP OF THE FEDERAL SENTENCING GUIDELINES TO
THE SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION PUZZLE
The Federal Sentencing Guidelines should theoretically reduce
the number of repeat prosecutions in the federal system. The Guide-
lines embrace a modified real offense scheme, which allows the court
to punish a defendant for related, but unadjudicated crimes at sen-
tencing.7 8 For example, under the Guidelines' relevant conduct pro-
Any offense involving the use of the mails, transportation in interstate or foreign
commerce, or the importation of an object or person into the United States is a con-
tinuing offense and, except as otherwise expressly provided by enactment of Congress,
may be inquired of and prosecuted in any district from, through, or into which such
commerce, mail matter, or imported object or person moves.
77 UNITED STATES ATroRNES' MANUAL 9-2.142(A) (3) (a) & (b) (1992) [hereinafter
U.S.A.M. (1992)]. This rationale likely explains the reprosecution of Salvatore Salamone
and his co-defendants in the Middle District of Pennsylvania after trial in the Southern
District of New York. Federal Agents from both New York and Philadelphia heavily pur-
sued the investigation of what eventually became known as the "Pizza Connection" case.
RALPH BLUMENTHAL, LASr DAYS OF THE SiCLANs: AT WAR WITH THE MAFIA: THE FBI As-
SAULT ON THE PIZZA CONNEcriON 165-66 (1988). Prosecution of an indictment filed in
Philadelphia was ultimately stayed in favor of a larger indictment filed in the Southern
District of New York. Id. Lasting more than sixteen months, the first "Pizza Connection"
trial was the longest and most expensive federal criminal trial in federal judicial history.
SHANA ALEXANDER, THE PIZZA CONNECTION 80 (1988). When the Southern District failed
to obtain a satisfactory verdict against Salvatore Salamone (he was acquitted of the most
serious charges), the Middle District of Pennsylvania reinitiated the dormant prosecution
which arose from the same criminal transaction as the New York conspiracy prosecution.
See United States v. Salamone, 869 F.2d 221, 222-23 (3d Cir. 1989). The Middle District of
Pennsylvania had apparently intended to dismiss the prosecution once an acceptable ver-
dict was obtained in New York. Instead, Salamone was required to defend allegations
based on the same evidence twice. Id. at 228-29. Interestingly, the Third Circuit's reversal
of some of Salamone's Pennsylvania convictions was vacated and remanded back to the
Third Circuit by the Supreme Court on the basis of Dowling v. United States, 493 U.S. 342
(1990). United States v. Salamone, 493 U.S. 1038 (1990). The Third Circuit ultimately
affirmed Salamone's convictions on all counts. United States v. Salamone, 902 F.2d 237,
240 (3d Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1030 (1991).
78 Real offense sentencing allows judges to consider factors outside the offense of con-
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vision,79 a defendant convicted on one count and acquitted on
another count may often be sentenced as if convicted on both
viction in ariving at the appropriate sentence length. "At its most expansive, a real offense
model might base punishment decisions on the following factors: The current conviction
and attendant circumstances; nonconviction offenses committed contemporaneously with
the conviction offense; nonconviction offenses committed after the conviction offense;
prior conviction and nonconviction offenses; and perhaps a host of biographic compo-
nents from good works to employment history." Elizabeth T. Lear, Is Conviction Irrelevant ,
40 UCLA L. Rnv. 1179, 1193 (1993). The Guidelines are considered a "modified" real
offense system because they engage in a much more limited inquiry than that described
above. Reliance on most offender characteristics, ancient criminal history, and other crim-
inal conduct unrelated to the offense of conviction is for the most part prohibited.
At the other extreme lies a charge, or conviction, offense system. Under such a re-
gime the offense of conviction determines the sentence. Uncharged or unconvicted of-
fenses are excluded from the sentence calculation. The Sentencing Commission preferred
a real offense scheme because it theoretically blunts the effects of prosecutorial charging
and plea bargaining decisions on sentence severity.
Although the real offense aspects of the guidelines may ultimately reduce the number
of redundant prosecutions in the federal system, the constitutional, moral, and social ob-
jections to the approach far outweigh that benefit. For this reason, nothing in this Article
should be taken as praise for the Guidelines' real offense choice. See id- Lear, supra note 6.
79 See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 1B1.3. The relevant conduct provision requires the sen-
tencing court to take into account certain related conduct and offenses when calculating
the defendant's "base offense level." Section 1B1.3 provides:
Relevant Conduct (Factors that Determine the Guidelines Range)
(a) Chapter Two (Offense Conduct) and Three (Adjustments). Unless otherwise specified,
(i) the base offense level where the guideline specifies more than one base of-
fense level, (ii) specific offense characteristics and (iii) cross references in Chap-
ter Two, and (iv) adjustments in Chapter Three, shall be determined on the basis
of the following.
(1) (A) All acts and omissions committed, aided, abetted, counseled, com-
manded, induced, procured, or willfully caused by the defendant; and
(B) in the case of a jointly undertaken criminal activity (a criminal plan,
scheme, endeavor, or enterprise undertaken by the defendant in concert
with others, whether or not charged as conspiracy), all reasonably foresee-
able acts and omissions of others in furtherance of the jointly undertaken
criminal activity, that occurred during the commission of the offense of
conviction, in preparation for that offense, or in the course of attempting
to avoid detection or responsibility for that offense.
(2) solely with respect to offenses of a character for which 3D1.2(d) would re-
quire grouping of multiple counts, all acts and omissions described in subdivi-
sions (1) (A) and (1) (B) above that were part of the same course of conduct
or common scheme or plan as the offense or conviction.
(3) all harm that resulted from the acts and omissions specified in subsections
(a) (1) and (a) (2) above, and all harm that was the object of such acts and
omissions ....
Designated the "cornerstone" of the guidelines' approach by Former Commission
chairman William Wilkins, seeWilliam W. Wilkins,Jr. &John R. Steer, Relevant Conduct: The
Cornerstone of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, 41 S.C. L. REv. 495 (1991), the relevant con-
duct provision has provoked an enormous amount of commentary which is almost uni-
formly hostile. See, e.g., Daniel Freed, Federal Sentencing in the Wake of the Guidelines:
Unacceptable Limits on the Discretion of Sentencers, 101 YALE L.J. 1681, 1741-52 (1992); Gerald
Heaney, Reality of Guideline Sentencing: No End to Disparity, 28 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 161, 185-
225 (1991); David Yellen, Illusion, illogic and Injustice: Real-Offense Sentencing and the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 78 MmN. L. REv. 402, 433-54 (1993).
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counts.80 The real offense approach thus allows the prosecutor to re-
pair inadequacies in either the indictment8l or trial presentation at
the sentencing stage. In cases where the government is disappointed
in the original verdict or has discovered additional evidence of a re-
lated, but uncharged crime, the Guidelines should reduce the incen-
tives to pursue a second indictment.
Even if the government considers the ultimate sentence inade-
quate, in many cases the Guidelines will deter a second prosecution
because the subsequent sentence is likely to be concurrent.8 2 The
Sentencing Commission sought to prevent prosecutors from manipu-
lating sentence length by either dismissing or adding related counts,
or by fragmenting the prosecution of counts into several proceed-
ings. 83 In cases in which a district pursues a subsequent indictment
for offenses already accounted for as relevant conduct in an earlier
80 See, e.g., United States v. Rivera-Lopez, 928 F.2d 372,372-73 (11th Cir. 1991) (convic-
tion on charge of distributing two kilograms of cocaine and acquittal on charge of distrib-
uting three kilograms in a separate transaction require the same sentence defendant would
have received had she been convicted of both counts); United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d
1238, 1243 (1lth Cir. 1991) (acquittal on conspiracy count irrelevant).
Not all acquittals result in sentences identical to those defendants would have received
had they been convicted of the acquitted conduct. For example, in cases involving acquit-
tals for use of a gun in connection with a drug offense, 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), the Guidelines
prescribe a "two-level" enhancement, U.S.S.G. supra note 5, § 2D1.1 (b), while conviction
requires a 5 to 30 year mandatory consecutive sentence depending on the type of firearm
involved. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) (1994).
81 See, e.g., United States v. Andrews, 948 F.2d 448, 448-50 (8th Cir. 1991) (using de-
fendant's admitted participation in five uncharged bank robberies to increase sentence for
aiding and abetting a single armed bank robbery).
82 In cases involvipg the subsequent prosecution of related offenses which were in-
cluded in the initial sentence pursuant to the relevant conduct provision, § 5G1.3(b) ar-
guably requires that a sentence imposed after the related prosecution run concurrently
with the first. See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5G1.3, Background Commentary (The "guide-
line is intended to result in an appropriate incremental punishment for the instant of-
fenses that most nearly approximates the sentence that would have been imposed had all
the sentences been imposed at the same time."). Section 5G1.3(b), entitled "Imposition of
a Sentence on a Defendant Subject to an Undischarged Term of Imprisonment" provides:
If... the undischarged term of imprisonment resulted from offense(s) that have been
fully taken into account in the determination of the offense level for the instant of-
fense, the sentence for the instant offense shall be imposed to run concurrently to the
undischarged term of imprisonment.
Though it is not entirely clear what "fully taken into account" actually means, the language
appears to be limited to situations involving related offenses factored into the original
sentence pursuant to the relevant conduct provision. See id., application note 2; THOMAS
W. HUTCHINSON & DAVID YELtxN, FEDERAL SENTENCING LAW AND PRACTICE 619 (2d Ed.
1994).
83 See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5G1.3(b), Background Commentary (The guideline "is
intended to result in an appropriate incremental punishment for the instant offenses that
most nearly approximates the sentence that would have been imposed had all the
sentences been imposed at the same time."); Ilene H. Nagel and Stephen J. Schulhofer, A
Tale of Three Cities: An Empirical Study of Charging and Bargaining Practices Under the Federal
Sentencing Guidelines, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 501, 505 (1992); Freed, supra note 79, at 1713-14.
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sentencing proceeding, the Guidelines eliminate the ability to in-
crease the defendant's sentence length through the second
prosecution.
However, not all related offense prosecutions yield concurrent
sentences. The proliferation of offenses carrying consecutive
mandatory minimum sentences have consistently undermined the
uniformity goals of the Sentencing Commission.84 In cases where the
offense carrying the mandatory minimum is not charged in the initial
prosecution, the lure of a significantly longer prison term may legiti-
mize a second prosecution. In addition, related offenses that are
either excluded by the Guidelines from the sentencing inquiry85 or
are accounted for in a way other than through a relevant conduct
enhancement 86 will draw a consecutive sentence if prosecuted
separately.
Similarly, if the subsequent indictment is returned for "political"
reasons,87 the existence of the Guidelines may increase the likelihood
of a second indictment.88 At the sentencing proceeding following the
84 SeeJudge William W. Wilkins, Jr., Chairman, United States Sentencing Commission,
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Crime and Criminal Justice of the House of Representatives
Committee on the Judiciary, July 28, 1993, 6 FED. SENT. REP. 67, 67-69 (1993) (explaining how
mindatory minimum sentencing adversely affects Guidelines' goals by creating disparity,
undermining certainty, and generally interfering with the Guidelines' ability to work
effectively).
85 Robbery is an example of an offense for which § 1B1.3(b) does not require aggregat-
ing the amounts stolen. Offenders who rob two banks and are convicted of only one bank
robbery are sentenced only on the basis of proceeds taken in the robbery for which they
were convicted. SeeYellen, supra note 79, at 484-38 (discussing the bank robbery example).
86 Some conduct is categorized as "specific offense characteristics" and although spe-
cific offense characteristics are used in the sentence calculation, they are not accounted for
pursuant to relevant conduct. For example, use of a gun in connection with a drug offense
is not relevant conduct to a drug conviction. It is a specific offense characteristic under
§ 2D1.1 (b) (1) and requires a two-level base offense level increase. A subsequent prosecu-
tion and conviction of the firearm offense would arguably fall outside the concurrent sen-
tencing requirements of U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5G1.3(b), see supra notes 83 to 84 and
accompanying text. It is arguable because the guideline requires a concurrent sentence
when the subsequent conviction offense has been "fully accounted for" in the first sentenc-
ing determination. Application note 2 appears to confine the "fully accounted for" lan-
guage to instances involving relevant conduct enhancements. U.S.S.G., supra note 5,
§ 5G1.3, Application note 2; see supra notes 79 to 83 and accompanying text.
87 Political reasons may include prosecutorial glory as well as conviction rate statistics
padding. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
88 The Second and Tenth Circuits prohibit the subsequent prosecution of offenses al-
ready punished through relevant conduct enhancements at the first proceeding. See
United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437 (2d Cir. 1993) and United States v. Koonce, 945
F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991), cert. denied 112 S. Ct. 1705 (1992). According to these courts,
the sentence attached to the second conviction, even if concurrent, would violate the mul-
tiple punishment prohibition of the Double Jeopardy Clause. McCormick, 992 F.2d at 441;
Koonce, 945 F.2d at 1153. Other Courts of Appeals have not followed suit. In fact, the Fifth
Circuit recently denounced the Second/Tenth Circuit approach as inconsistent with long-
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original conviction, the prosecutor may offer evidence of related crim-
inal acts pursuant to the relevant conduct provision. If the govern-
ment pursues a subsequent prosecution based upon the crimes
already accounted for in the first sentence, the defendant will have
little incentive to resist the second indictment. As noted, the sentence
for a conviction in the second prosecution will run concurrently to
the first. Thus, the defendant loses little by pleading guilty. And even
if the defendant insists upon a trial, the government's job is made
simpler by the first conviction. The prosecution will have obtained a
preview of the defendant's defense at the original sentencing pro-
ceeding.89 In addition, the defendant is unlikely to take the stand
because the prosecutor may use the related conviction to impeach his
testimony. Thus, for districts seeking to improve their conviction sta-
tistics or public image, the Guidelines may actually encourage succes-
sive prosecution.
The Guidelines are not the panacea for the federal successive
prosecution problem. Although the Guidelines may eliminate some
incentives for reprosecution in the federal system, substantial pres-
sures favoring piecemeal litigation remain. Regardless of the legiti-
macy of these pressures, the costs associated with duplicative
prosecution are potentially high. The next section examines the costs
traditionally associated with successive prosecution.
standing sentencing and double jeopardy jurisprudence. See United States v. Burger, 21
F.3d 70, 76 (5th Cir. 1994). Although the Fifth Circuit may be correct that the practice
does not offend the Double Jeopardy Clause, this is because the clause is ill-designed to
police successive punishment scenarios which do not involve convictions in the original
proceeding. The Second and Tenth Circuits were correct that a constitutional violation
occurred. Due Process was offended when the offense was originally punished in the ab-
sence of indictment and trial. See Lear, supra note 6. The likelihood that the courts will
recognize the patent unconstitutionality of the Guidelines' real offense system is remote.
Therefore, this Article discusses the successive prosecution problem as if no serious flaws in
the Guidelines' scheme exist.
89 Sentencing hearings are theoretically informal proceedings, operating outside the
scope of most constitutional protections and the rules of evidence. See Margaret A. Berger,
Rethinking the Applicability of Evidentiary Rules at Sentencing: Of Relevant Conduct and Hearsay
and the Need for an Infield Fly Rule, 5 FED. SEN-r. REP. 96, 96 (1992). To obtain an enhance-
ment for relevant conduct, the government needs only prove the conduct by a preponder-
ance of the evidence. See, e.g., United States v. Salmon, 948 F.2d 776 (D.C. Cir. 1991);
United States v. Manor, 936 F.2d 1238 (1lth Cir. 1991); United States v. Restrepo, 903 F.2d
648 (9th Cir. 1990). But see United States v. Kikumura, 918 F.2d 1084, 1101 (3d Cir. 1990)
(recommending application of a clear and convincing standard in some unusual circum-
stances). Such proof often consists of a government agent's testimony regarding the sub-
stance of allegations made by an unidentified informant. Practically speaking, the
defendant must put on an affirmative case to avoid enhancement. Thus, even in situations
where the government fails to secure a sentencing enhancement for a related offense, it
obtains an important preview of the facts supporting the defendant's defense. Such discov-
ery allows the government to perfect its case in light of information it would not otherwise
have.
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C. POTENTIAL COSTS OF UNRESTRICTED REPROSECUTION
A number of commentators have questioned whether the crimi-
nal system might benefit from the civil system's approach to the suc-
cessive litigation problem.90 Duplicative litigation in the civil system is
dealt with quite ruthlessly under the common law doctrine of resjudi-
cata, or claim preclusion. 91 Civil litigants receive one opportunity to
settle disputes arising from a particular factual scenario. After the ini-
tial judgement, claim preclusion, or more specifically the rule against
splitting,92 bars any further attempt to litigate events arising from a
common nucleus of operative fact.93 The rule extends to litigated and
unlitigated claims regardless of merit or legal theory. Plaintiffs omit
weak, yet potentially viable claims at their peril.
Claim preclusion furthers both individual and systemic interests
by "encourag[ing] reliance on judicial decision, barr[ing] vexatious
litigation and free[ing] the courts to resolve other disputes."94 By in-
sisting that litigants resolve related disputes in a single proceeding,
claim preclusion protects the limited resources of the courts. Effi-
ciency is at a premium; "every dispute that is reheard means that an-
other will be delayed."95 Res judicata protects the individual from
harassment by allowing dispute resolution to be final. Lastly, claim
preclusion avoids the inevitable diminution in public confidence that
accompanies inconsistent judicial pronouncements. As Professors
Friedenthal, Kane, and Miller observe, "since there is no reason to
suppose that the second or third determination of a claim is necessar-
ily more accurate than the first, the first should be left undisturbed."96
The costs of unrestricted reprosecution both on a systemic and
individual level are of potentially greater significance in the criminal
system than in the civil system. The current approach leaves the de-
fendant vulnerable to debilitating government harassment.97 Re-
90 See Allan D. Vestal & DouglasJ. Gilbert, Preclusion of Duplicative Prosecutions: a Develop-
ing Mosaic, 47 Mo. L. REv. 1, 2-4 (1982); see also Kirchheimer, supra note 10, at 534-39
(advocating a transaction approach if the amendment rules are modified).
91 Scholars and courts often use Res Judicata to refer to both claim and issue preclu-
sion. JACK H. FnarNTHAL Er AL, CVL PROCEDURE, 614-17 (2d ed. 1993). This discussion
focuses specifically on claim preclusion. Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, is a more
limited doctrine applicable to criminal cases in some instances.
92 Claim preclusion is the modem term for the common law rule against splitting. Id.
at 617-21.
93 Id. at 646.
94 Brown v. Felsen, 442 U.S. 127, 131 (1979).
95 FRIEDENTHAL Er AL.., supra note 91, at 617.
96 Id. at 618.
97 This point is part of any constitutional discussion of the successive trials prohibition.
See, e.g., Comment, supra note 10, at 277 ("Double Jeopardy protects the defendant from
continued distress, enables him to consider the matter closed and to plan ahead accord-
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peated trials prevent individuals from "getting on with their lives";
defending an accusation of criminal wrongdoing is an all-consuming
activity. But the real danger is more insidious than mere vexation.98
The criminal law is the most powerful tool available to the govern-
ment to silence its detractors. 99 There is no better way to undermine
a political dissident's credibility, impair a candidate's ability to finance
a campaign, or prevent a reporter from presenting a viewpoint than to
subject her to a series of criminal trials. Under the current approach,
only the grand jury'00 and the good faith of government actors stand
between the activist and such harassment. 101
Most importantly, repeated attempts to convict undermine the
accuracy of the subsequent verdict. 10 2 An aggressive defense to a
ingly."). The most compelling description of the general successive trials problem is prob-
ably Justice Black's oft-quoted statement in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184, 187-88
(1957):
The underlying idea, one that is deeply ingrained in at least the Anglo-American sys-
tem of jurisprudence, is that the State with all its resources and power should not be al-
lowed to make repeated attempts to convict an individual for an alleged offense, thereby
subjecting him to embarrassment, expense and ordeal and compelling him to live in a
continuing state of anxiety and insecurity, as well as enhancing the possibility that even
though innocent he may be found guilty.
The overt successive prosecution policies of the National Obscenity Enforcement Unit
(NOEU) provide an excellent example of the potential for harassment. The NOEU pur-
sues multi-district prosecutions hoping to bankrupt defendants or to force plea bargains.
Ingram, supra note 71, at 269. While this strategy may be commendable in some instances,
it becomes dangerous when the government erroneously believes that materials protected
by the First Amendment are pornographic. It is dangerous, because it jeopardizes First
Amendment rights as litigation costs may make vindication of those rights financially im-
possible. Id. at 271.
98 Comment, supra note 10, at 286.
99 See Akhil R. Amar, The Bill of Rights as Constitution, 100 YALE LJ. 1131, 1182 (1991).
100 Commentators typically describe the grandjury as both a shield and a sword. LAFA E
& ISRAEL, supra note 53, at 376. It operates as a sword in its performance as an investigative
agency, and as a shield or screening agency by interposing itself between the government
and the individual. Id. at 376. By refusing to indict when evidence is insufficient or when
prosecutorial overreaching is present, the grand jury protects the individual citizen from
unwarranted government prosecution. Id. But critics have long contended that the grand
jury is a mere "rubber stamp" for the prosecution and that the protection to the individual
theoretically provided by this body is illusory. Id at 693.
101 This does not mean that the federal government routinely uses the criminal sanction
to harass its opponents. In fact, media scrutiny may render such a strategy politically im-
possible. On the other hand, the government has subjected political figures to criminal
prosecution, Representative Dan Rostenkowski and Mayor Marion Barry providing recent
examples. Certainly, the systematic harassment of Planned Parenthood by repeated IRS
audits during the Reagan presidency implies that the government is capable of abusing the
reprosecution power for political reasons, if only in the administrative context. See Robert
Pear, Planned Parenthood Groups Investigated on Use of U.S. Funds, N.Y. TIMES, December 6,
1981, at A30; Harassing Planned Parenthood, N.Y. TIMES, December 15, 1981, at A30.
102 MARTIN L FRIEDLAND, DOUBLEJEOPARDY 4 (1969) (describing the possibility that an
innocent person may be found guilty as the "core of the problem"); Green v. United States,
355 U.S. 184, 187-88 (1957) (stressing that repeated trials may cause the defendant to be
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criminal accusation is an extremely expensive proposition. Few indi-
viduals can afford to mount such a defense more than once. The ex-
pense and the mental fatigue may induce an innocent defendant to
accept a generous plea agreement. And even if the defendant fights
on at a second trial, he is at a distinct disadvantage. The prosecution
has had a dress rehearsal regarding the pertinent facts. The statutory
offense may have changed, but the evidentiary basis remains the same.
The prosecution benefits from the detailed account of the defend-
ant's story set forth in the first proceeding. A second trial allows the
government to review and perfect its original case.1 03 Even an inno-
cent defendant may be convicted by a well-choreographed presenta-
tion of the evidence. Repeated prosecutions based on a single factual
scenario present a real danger to the defendant by dominating his
time, depleting his finances, and possibly by incarcerating him
wrongfully.
The extent of the systemic injury generated by repeat prosecution
in terms of pure resource dedication is unclear. As noted, the volume
of duplicative litigation will depend upon a number of variables, 'in-
cluding executive enforcement priorities. Given that the potential for
pervasive reprosecution exists, the systemic impact could be
profound. The federal courts are in crisis; they have been over-
whelmed by criminal cases without a corresponding increase in court
personnel. 104 Every criminal case makes it less likely that a civil jury
trial will go forward.' 05 Each criminal trial requires the full attention
found guilty even though innocent).
103 Interestingly, conversations with federal prosecutors revealed that they may not share
this perception. Their view, especially in cases involving savvy defendants (such as organ-
ized crime figures), is that the government's case does not improve with age. The govern-
ment's witnesses have also been cross examined and may well forget key information
during the later trial.
104 During the fifteen years between 1976 and 1991, district court judgeships grew
nearly 42% to 531. See U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSTICE STATISTICS
1990, at 52 (Kathleen Maguire et al. eds., 1991) [hereinafter SouRCEBooK 1990]; U.S.
DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CriuMINAL JusrIcE STATITICS 1992, at 73 (Kathleen
Maguire et al. eds., 1993) [hereinafter SouRCEBooK 1992]. This growth was far less than
the corresponding growth of criminal offenses. Between 1982 and 1991, criminal cases
pending in U.S. district courts grew more than 127%. SOURCErBOOK 1992, supra, at 494.
Drug offenses accounted for much of this, growing 258% between 1980 and 1990. Id. at
485. In 1991, district court judges had an average of more than 70 cases pending before
each of them. Id. at 494.
105 The amount of time devoted to federal civil trials is dwindling. See Patrick E. Logan,
The Shot Clock Comes to Tria" Time Limits for Federal Civil Trials, 35 ARiz. L. RExv. 663, 669
U993). Between 1973 and 1992, the number of civil trials in the district courts fell by
more than three percent, despite a 230% increase in civil filings and a 61% increase in the
number of authorized districtjudgeships. See id. and citations therein. In the year ending
30 June 1987, the median time from filing a complaint to disposition by trial for the mid-
die 80% of cases was 20 months. MECHAM, ANN. REP. OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMIN.
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of the district court, thus delaying other pending motions and hear-
ings. 106 In the Guidelines environment, the need for repeated sen-
tencing hearings alone may constitute a significant commitment of
judicial resources. 10 7 Continual reconsideration of a criminal act may
be a luxury that the federal courts cannot afford.
The resource drain potentially created by successive prosecutions
extends to both the federal prosecutors and federal defenders offices.
Assistant United States Attorneys juggle impressive caseloads.108 Every
duplicative prosecution means that they must ignore, abandon, or
downgrade another case. The problem from the federal defender's
perspective may be even more acute. 10 9 There are fewer federal de-
OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS 213 (1987). This clogging of the federal courts undoubtedly
fosters the settlement of meritorious civil claims. See Rhonda Wasserman, Equity Trans-
formed: Preliminary Injunctions to Require the Payment of Money, 70 B.U. L. REv. 623, 625 n.12
(1990) (95% of the civil cases in U.S. District courts that were terminated during the year
ending 30 June 1987 were settled or otherwise disposed of before trial) (citing MEC-AM,
supra, at 211).
The median amount of time from filing to disposition of criminal cases in the federal
courts in the year ending 30 June 1991 was 4.8 months, and where ajury trial took place,
the mean time amounted to 7.6 months. SOURCEBOOK 1992, supra note 104, at 502. That
year, district courts conducted 8925 criminal trials and 19,949 civil trials. Id. at 500.
106 District Judge Aubrey E. Robinson, Jr. remarked that "[w]hile the total number of
criminal filings [has] remained [stable], judges] are receiving more indictments involving
complex conspiracies, multiple defendants and multiple counts, 25, 30, 40 count indict-
ments seem to be run of the mill now and a number of these cases are going to trial. One
result of the complexity of our civil and criminal litigation is an increase in the amount of
time that our judges are spending injury trials." Proceedings of the 47th Annual Judicial
Conference of the District of Columbia Circuit, 114 F.R.D. 419, 427 (1987).
107 See FEDERAL COURTS STUDY COMM., REPORT OF THE FEDERAL COURTS STUDY CoMMIrr-
TEE 137 (1990) (reporting that a post-Guidelines survey found that more than 50% of
federal judges responding estimated a 25% increase in time devoted to sentencing, while
one-third estimated and increase of 50%). Repeated sentencing hearings also have an
adverse impact on the probation officer who must prepare the presentence investigation
report for each hearing.
108 In 1992, approximately 4180 AUSAs, see Luban, supra note 42, at 1766 n.11, prose-
cuted 59,198 defendants. SOURCEBOOK 1992, SUPRA note 104, at 476.
109 Federal public defenders are overburdened to an extreme degree. See United States
v. Rogers, 602 F. Supp. 1332, 1350 (D. Colo. 1985) (public defenders cannot match the
time and resources that prosecution in RICO and CCE cases expend); Legal Ethifs 1990:
What Every La er Needs to Know, 403 P.L.I. LITIGATION AND ADM. PRACTICE COURSE HAND-
BOOK SERIES 411 (public defenders see an endless waiting line for services). While federal
defenders are often very skilled and more knowledgeable about criminal law than most
private attorneys, "case overload (which can only get worse...) may nullify much of fed-
eral defenders' specialist advantage over private attorneys .... Beyond case overload, the
lack of funds available to public defenders may prevent the employment of expert wit-
nesses, investigators, and others who. might build a credible defense." Paul Finkelman, The
Second Casualty of War: Civil Liberties and the War on Drugs, 66 S. CAL. L. Ro:v 1389, 1441
(1993); Mark L. Walters, Note, American Dreammasters v. The Cocaine Cowboys: Caplin, Mo0-
santo, and the New Cold War, 69 TEx. L. Rrv. 159, 193-94 (1990) (in most complex cases, an
overburdened public defender will not be as effective an advocate as a privately retained
lawyer who can afford to devote as much time as necessary to fully prepare the defense).
648 [Vol. 85
SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION PHIENOMENON
fenders than Assistant U.S. Attorneys. 110 And defender caseloads con-
tinue to grow,' while their budgets continue to shrink."12 Unlike
the prosecutors, defenders do not control their caseloads; they are at
the mercy of the government. Each joinable offense that the govern-
ment prosecutes separately diverts defender resources from equally
deserving defendants and dilutes taxpayer dollars designed to provide
federal defendants with competent counsel.
Redundant prosecution also undermines the integrity of the jus-
tice system. The damage to the criminal jury system caused by rep-
rosecution after acquittal or conviction on a discounted charge is
considerably more dangerous than relitigation in the civil system. Al-
lowing the government to ignore hostile verdicts *strikes at the heart of
the criminal jury's nullification power. Consider, as Professor Westen
points out, that courts cannot constitutionally confine the criminal
jury to fact-finding. Numerous jury control devises, ranging from the
directed verdict to ordering a new trial, are "constitutionally em-
ployed in civil cases because they do not intrude upon any function
that the civil jury is constitutionally entitled to perform."113 In the
civil system, the reconsideration of a previous jury verdict offends only
the factual decisions of the prior jurors.
In the criminal system, reconsideration of the original "not
guilty" verdict or even a "guilty" verdict involving a lesser crime, in-
110 This is actually a gross understatement. In October 1990, more than 42 individuals
worked in federal prosecution and legal services for each individual working in the federal
public defenders office. SOURCEBOOK 1992, supra note 104, at 23. In 1992, federal public
defenders and assistants numbered 589. Id.
111 The increasing use of forfeiture actions under 21 U.S.C. § 853 against private attor-
neys only exacerbates this problem. See United States v. lanniello, 644 F. Supp. 452, 456
(S.D.N.Y. 1985) (forfeiture possibility would make private attorney reluctant to handle
RICO cases); United States v. Badalamenti, 614 F. Supp. 194, 196-97 (S.D.N.Y. 1985) (for-
feiture sends attorneys message not to represent criminal defendant because fee may be
lost); Anthony G. Vella, Note, Caplin & Drysdale, Chartered v. United States: Seizing Attor-
ney Fees-Frozen Assets orFrozenJustice? The Sixth Amendment Right to Counsel of Choice is Given
the Cold Shoulder, 11 N. ILi.. U. L. Rxv. 155, 182-83 (1990) (recognizing reluctance of private
attorneys, subject to forfeiture of fees, to accept a defendant who is under a cloud of forfei-
ture); BruceJ. Winick, Forfeiture of Attorneys'Fees Under RICO and CCE and the Right to Counsel
of Choke: The ConstitutionalDilemma and How to Avoid I 43 U. MrAMi L. Rav. 765, 781 (1989)
(exodus of talented lawyers from defense bar due to forfeiture may be devastating); see
Fricker, Dirty Money, 75 A.BA. J. 60, 64 (Nov. 1989) (pointing out that "Miami lawyerJoel
Hirschhorn announced he would no longer defend drug traffickers because three of his
fees had been seized."). "Perhaps most troubling is the fact that forfeiture statutes place
the Government in the position to exercise an intolerable degree of power over any private
attorney who takes on the task of representing a defendant in a forfeiture case." Caplin &
Drysdale, Chartered v. United States, 491 U.S. 617, 650 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
112 The October 1990 federal defender payroll amounted to $2,014,000, a fraction of
the prosecution payroll of $82,159,000. SouacmooK 1992, supra note 104, at 23.
113 Peter Westen, The Three Faces of Double Jeopardy: Reflections on Government Appeals of
Criminal Sentences, 78 MICH. L Rliv. 1001, 1015 (1980).
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vades the first jury's right to show mercy. Regardless of whether one
categorizes nullification as a "right" or merely a "power,"114 courts
cannot constitutionally confine the criminal jury to the role of fact
finding. 1 5 The jury possesses a "species of legislative power"" 6-the
power to dispense leniency where the law prescribes none. In a suc-
cessive prosecution case involving the reintroduction of the bulk of
the original evidence, the initial jury has arguably made a decision
regarding the defendant's culpability for the "act" at issue. Such a
decision cannot logically be confined to the specific offense defini-
tion; it represents a rough approximation by the jury of the appropri-
ate punishment for the defendant's behavior. Allowing the
prosecution to redefine the crime and relitigate the facts presented in
the initial trial neatly divests the first jury of its nullification
prerogative.
Even in instances of clear error on the part of the jury,117 succes-
sive prosecution is seldom worth the price. Successive prosecution,
like duplicative litigation in the civil system, undermines public re-
spect for, and confidence in, the courts. The societal consequences
stemming from a loss of confidence in the criminal justice system are
particularly grave. To feel secure, a society must believe that its crimi-
nal justice system works-that the system is effective in incarcerating
the guilty and setting the innocent free. Every time the government
attempts to avoid or modify a prior verdict through a subsequent pros-
ecution based on the same facts, it suggests to the populace that the
justice system is untrustworthy; it fuels public belief that the system
routinely releases dangerous criminals on technicalities. Such an atti-
tude breeds fear, contempt for law enforcement, and, ultimately, vigi-
lantism among the privileged. And among the disenfranchised, the
failure of government to respect jury verdicts can only fuel charges of
inequity and bias. The United States has an entire subpopulation that
believes that the government will incarcerate them at some point re-
gardless of their guilt. Repeated attempts to convict on identical facts
simply reinforce this view, which again, leads to disrespect for the
114 Whether the nullification prerogative is a "right" or simply a tolerated usurpation of
power continues to provoke intense debate. See, e.g., GaryJ. Simson,Juy Null!fication in the
American System. A Skeptical View, 54 TEX. L REv. 488 (1976); Chaya Weinberg-Brodt, Note,
Juy Nullification andJury-Control Procedures, 65 N.Y.U. L. REy. 825 (1990); Westen, supra
note 113, at 1018.
115 Westen, supra note 113, at 1017.
116 Westen, supra note 113, at 1012.
117 The acquittal of the Los Angeles police officers in the original "Rodney King" case
immediately leaps to mind as the classic example of "clear error." This case is discussed in
the context of society's interest in correcting errors in Part II.B., infra.
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criminal law and ultimately to social upheaval." 8 Respect for the
criminal justice system is crucial to a successful democracy; redundant
prosecution, like any action that erodes public confidence in the in-
tegrity of criminal verdicts, should not be undertaken lightly.
I. REvisrnNG THE TRANSACTION RuL DEBATE
Although the costs of successive prosecution are potentially quite
high, efforts to establish prosecutorial joinder requirements similar to
those used in the civil system have been consistently resisted. Numer-
ous scholars, jurists, and policy makers have advocated some version
of a transaction rule for criminal prosecutions. Justice Brennan's at-
tempts in the constitutional setting began with his concurrence in
Ashe v. Swenson where he argued that "the prosecution, except in the
most limited circumstances, [should be required] to join at one trial
all charges against a defendant that grow out of a single criminal act,
occurrence, episode, or transaction."" 9 Policy initiatives suggesting
similar regimes have met with some success. In the 1960s and early
1970s, the American Law Institute, 20 the American Bar Associa-
tion,' 2 ' and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
118 C.f. Paul Robinson, Foreword: The Criminal-Civil Distinction and Dangerous Blameless Of-
fenders, 83J. CRiM. L & CRIMINOLOGY 693 (1993). Professor Robinson argues that
[i]f the law closely matches people's shared intuitive notions ofjustice, it grows in its
power to act as a model for their conduct. If the law is seen as being unjust, its power
as a moral force is diminished. A society that imposes criminal liability on persons
that the community regards as not sufficiently blameworthy risks destroying this mo-
tive to adhere to the laws.
Id. at 708.
119 Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 453-54 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring).
120 See MODEL PENAL CODE § 1.07 (Proposed Official Draft 1962). Subsection (2)
provides:
(2) Limitation on Separate Trials for Multiple Offenses. Except as provided in Subsection
(3) of this Section, a defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple
offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such
offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the com-
mencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court.
When first proposed in 1956, subsection two was broader in scope and required thejoin-
der of multiple charges when:
(a) the offenses are based on the same conduct; or
(b) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions motivated by a purpose to
accomplish a single criminal objective, and necessary or incidental to accomplish-
ment of that objective; or
(c) the offenses are based on a series of acts or omissions motivated by a common
purpose or plan and which result in the repeated commission of the same offense
or affect the same person or the same persons or the property thereof.
Id. The Council, however, felt that the scope of the 1956 proposal was too broad. Id.
121 See STANDARDs RELATING TOJOINDER AND SEVERANCE § 1.3 (ABA Project on Minimum
Standards for Criminal Justice, Tent. Draft 1967); MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 120,
§ 1.0. Section 1.3, entitled Failure to Join Related Offenses, provides in pertinent part:
(a) Two or more offense are related offenses, for purposes of this standard, if they
are within the jurisdiction of the same court and are based on the same conduct or
EUZABETH T. LEAR
State Laws' 22 independently proposed versions of a transaction-based
joinder rule. A number of states have embraced some form of com-
pulsory joinder in criminal prosecutions, 123 but the majority of the
states and the federal system operate with only nominal restrictions on
the successive prosecution power.
Critics have raised two general objections to a more demanding
joinder requirement in the criminal arena. First, they contend that a
factually-driven approach will generate an unacceptable degree of un-
certainty in criminal prosecutions. Second, they argue that the gov-
ernment needs to retain the ability to bring a second prosecution to
correct unacceptable outcomes. Neither argument sufficiently justi-
fies the broad successive prosecution power currently enjoyed by fed-
eral prosecutors.
A. UNCERTAINTY
The fatal defect traditionally ascribed to a transaction approach
in the constitutional setting is uncertainty. 24 The literature is replete
arise from the same criminal episode.
(b) When a defendant has been charged with two or more related offenses, his
timely motion to join them for trial should be granted unless the court determines
that because the prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient evidence to warrant
trying some of the offenses at that time, or for some other reason, the ends ofjustice
would be defeated if the motion were granted ....
(c) A defendant who has been tried for one offense may thereafter move to dis-
miss a charge for a related offense, unless a motion for joinder of these offense was
previously denied or the right ofjoinder was waived.... The motion to dismiss must
be made prior to the second trial, and should be granted unless the court determines
that because the prosecuting attorney did not have sufficient evidence to warrant try-
ing this offense at the time of the first trial, or for some other reason, the ends of
justice would be defeated if the motion were granted.
(d) Entry of a plea of nolo contendere to one offense does not bar the subse-
quent prosecution of a related offense....
Id.
122 UNIF. R. Ciam. P. 471 (1974) provides:
(a) Related offenses defined. Two or more offenses are related offenses, for the
purposes of this Rule, if they are within the jurisdiction of the same court and are
based on the same conduct or arise from the same criminal episode.
(b) Joinder of related offenses. Upon motion of the defendant.., the court shall
join for trial two or more charges of related offenses, unless it determines that because
the prosecuting attorney does not presently have sufficient evidence to warrant trying
one or more of the charges, or for some other reason, the joinder would defeat the
ends ofjustice.
Id.
123 Twenty-three states currently operate under some type of transaction restriction. For
an in-depth look at the various state provisions, see generally Vestal & Gilbert, supra note
90, at 1 (contrasting various states' practices under compulsory joinder rules).
124 Justice Scalia implied that the main reason the Grady rule was "unworkable" was
because it had provoked great uncertainty in the lower federal courts. See United States v.
Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849, 2852 (1993) ("Grady must be overruled because it contradicted an
unbroken line of decisions, contained less than accurate historical analysis, and has pro-
duced confusion.") (emphasis added). See also Thomas, supra note 10, at 332-33 (noting that
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with excellent examples illustrating the potential problems in defin-
ing the "transaction."125 More restrained approaches often suffer
from the same malleability problems. 26 Therefore, it seems impor-
tant to ask whether certainty is of such importance in this area that a
transaction or other factually based approach is simply untenable.
Definitional difficulties alone have not traditionally disqualified
terms from application in the criminal context After all, what is prob-
able cause, a reasonable suspicion, 27 and, for that matter, a reason-
able doubt? Interpretation of words is surely an unavoidable necessity
in the law. And unfortunately (or perhaps fortunately from the pro-
fessional lawyer's point of view) words alone are seldom self-
defining.' 28
the "same transaction test's greatest flaw is that it creates further definitional problems");
Note, supra note 10, at 968-69; Comment, supra note 10, at 276 ("The principal shortcom-
ing of this approach is that any sequence of conduct can be defined as an 'act' or a
'transaction.'").
125 See, e.g., Thomas, supra note 10, at 377-78 ("A defendant.. . conspires to rob a victim
and then rapes and robs her... The conspiracy to commit robbery is probably not part of
the same criminal transaction as the commission of the robbery, but it is more difficult to
decide whether the rape and robbery are part of the same transaction. Does it matter how
much time elapsed between the crimes? Does it matter if the defendant did not decide to
rape the victim until after he had completed the robbery?"); Comment, supra note 10, at
276 ("A man is shaving. How many acts is he doing? Is shaving an act? Yes. Is changing
the blade in one's razor an act? Yes. Is applying lather to one's face an act? ... Yes, yes,
yes.").
126 See Sara Barton, Note, Grady v. Corbin: An Unsuccessfld Effort to Define "Same Offense",
25 GA. L. REv. 143, 159 (1990) (finding that the Grady approach to defining "same offense"
will not simplify application of the double jeopardy principle); Poulin, supra note 63, at 99
(criticizing the Grady approach for contributing to, rather than dispelling, the confusion
over what constitutes a single course of criminal conduct for double jeopardy purposes);
Thomas, supra note 10, at 333 n.54 (pointing out that both the "single intent" and the "gist
of offenses" tests suffer from malleability problems).
Even the Blockburgr approach so faithfully.embraced in Dixon is problematic to apply.
See United States v. Dixon, 113 S. Ct. 2849 (1993). Although Justice Scalia managed to
convince a majority of the Court to overrule Grady because of its lack of "deep historical
roots" in favor of the "familiar" Blockburger approach, the majority disintegrated when it
came to applying Blockburger. See Dixon, 113 S. Ct. at 2860, 2865 (Rhenquist, C.J., concur-
ring in part and dissenting in part). Justice Rhenquist, joined byJustices O'Connor and
Thomas opined that the focus of the Blockburger analysis should be on the statutory ele-
ments of the offense charged, and not on the facts that must be proven under the particu-
lar court orders in question as contended by Justices Scalia and Kennedy. Id. at 2867.
Therefore, instead of correcting the malleability problems of Grady, the fragmented Court
in Dixon became mired in the application problems of the "familiar" test it was adopting.
127 See Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). The uncertainty surrounding search and
seizure is arguably of greater significance than any prosecutorial rule. Prosecutors have
the luxury of time in drafting indictments and the ability to amend those indictments with
little difficulty. Police, on the other hand, must make quick judgments in dynamic
situations.
128 Wimess the debate over methods of statutory construction. See, e.g., William N. Es-
kridge, Jr. & Phillip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV.
321 (1990) (discussing the anxiety produced in scholars and judges by the need to deny
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The civil system has encountered similar definitional difficulties.
The precise meaning of "cause of action" or "claim" remains open to
debate. As Professor Cleary pointed out in the early days of the fed-
eral rules, when attempting to determine what could have been liti-
gated in the initial proceeding,
we leave the workaday world and enter into a wondrous realm of words,
where results are obtained not by grubbing out facts but by application
of incantations which change pumpkins into coaches and one man's
property into another's. The incantations are the various definitions of
what constitutes a cause of action.' 29
In spite of initial difficulties, the civil system has not changed its
course. The federal courts generally prefer the approach advocated
in the Restatement of Judgments Second:13 0
the existence of indeterminacy and values in statutory construction).
129 Edward W. Cleary, ResJudicata Reexamined, 57 YALE Lj. 339, 343 (1948).
130 See, e.g., Gonzalez v. Banco Cent. Corp., 27 F.3d 751, 755-56 (1st Cir. 1994) (applying
the transactional approach of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments); Manego v. Orle-
ans Bd. of Trade, 733 F.2d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 475 U.S. 1084 (1986) (explicitly
adopting the transactional approach of the Restatement (Second) of Judgments); Prime
Management Co., Inc. v. Steinegger, 904 F.2d 811, 816 (2d Cir. 1990) (applying the trans-
actional approach to claim preclusion issues); Lubrizol Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960,
963-64 (3d Cir. 1991) (adhering to "the present trend" of the transactional approach);
Keith v. Aldridge, 900 F.2d 736, 740 (4th Cir. 1990) (adopting the transactional approach
of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments as consistent with the modem trend); Agrilec-
tric Power Partners, Ltd. v. General Elec. Co., 20 F.3d 663, 665 (5th Cir. 1994) (stating that
the Fifth Circuit has adopted the transactional approach for determining whether two
complaints involve the same cause of action); Sanders Confectionery Prod., Inc. v. Heller
Fin., Inc., 973 F.2d 474, 484 (6th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1046 (1993) (finding
that "[i] dentity of causes of action [for res judicata purposes] means an 'identity of the
facts creating the right of action and of the evidence necessary to sustain each action'"
(quoting Westwood Chem. Co. v. Kulick, 656 F.2d 1224, 1227 (6th Cir. 1981)); Lim v.
Central DuPage Hosp., 972 F.2d 758, 763 (7th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1586
(1993) (stating that the Seventh Circuit has utilized the transactional approach); Car Carri-
ers, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 789 F.2d 589, 593 (7th Cir. 1985) (stating that the transactional
test is decidedly fact-oriented); Armstrong v. Norwest Bank, Minneapolis, NA.., 964 F.2d
797, 802 (8th Cir. 1992) (applying the approach of the Restatement (Second) of Judg-
ments); Constantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d 1199, 1201-02 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
459 U.S. 1087 (1982) (adopting the transactional approach); Clark v. Haas Group, Inc.,
953 F.2d 1235, 1236-37 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 98 (1992) (stating that the Tenth
Circuit has adopted the transactional approach advocated by the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments); Wallis v.Justice Oaks II, Ltd., 898 F.2d 1544, 1551 (11th Cir. 1990) (applying
the transactional approach of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments); U.S. Indus., Inc. v.
Blake Constr. Co., Inc., 765 F.2d 195, 205 (D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding that the D.C. Circuit
had adopted the approach of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments); Young Eng'rs, Inc.
v. United States Int'l Trade Comm., 721 F.2d 1305, 1314 (Fed. Cir. 1983) (adhering to the
approach of the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments); Rowe v. United States, 4 Cl. Ct. 39,
43 (1983) (applying the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments); See a/soJohn F. Wagner,
Annotation, Proper Test to Determine Identity of Claims for Purposes of Claim Preclusion by Res
Judicata Under Federal Law, 82 A.L.1. FED. 829, 837 (1987) (finding that the clear trend in
most recent decisions of the federal courts has been toward the transactional approach of
the Restatement (Second) ofJudgments).
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What factual grouping constitutes a "transaction", and what groupings
constitute a "series", are to be determined pragmatically, giving weight
to such considerations as whether the facts are related in time, space,
origin, or motivation, whether they form a convenient trial unit, and
whether their treatment as a unit conforms to the parties' expectations
or business understanding or usage.1 3 '
Practice under the Rules of Civil Procedure has established workable
parameters. 32 Some worthy claims have been barred, but the effi-
ciency gains have been thought to be worth the occasional harsh
result.
Before embracing a similar approach in the criminal system, how-
ever, it is necessary to examine whether there is some reason to attach
greater importance to certainty in the criminal context than in the
civil context. The lack of a clear, bright linejoinder rule in the crimi-
nal arena could produce three different problems:
(1) the court might erroneously deny the defendant's motion to dismiss
a redundant prosecution, thus wrongfully causing the defendant to face
a second trial;
(2) the prosecution might interpret the rule too narrowly and fail to join
an offense which it should join;
(3) the prosecution; fearing a broad interpretation, might join offenses
which it could legitimately prosecute separately.
Regarding the first scenario, it is unlikely that critics resist com-
pulsory joinder because a defendant's expectations of finality might
be dashed by an unduly narrow interpretation of the transaction.
Theoretically, defendants could rely to their detriment on the rule,
expending all their resources at the first trial. But realistically, de-
fendants probably do not husband resources in this manner. A crimi-
nal prosecution is a battle for survival, not a business transaction. 33
Thus, from the defendant's point of view, the situation can only im-
prove; malleability is not a stumbling block.
The second scenario, that the prosecutor may underestimate the
breadth of the rule, fail to charge a known offense,' M and be barred
131 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFJUDGMENTS § 24(2) (1982).
132 Cf May v. Parker-Abbott Transfer and Storage, Inc., 899 F.2d 1007, 1009-10 (10th
Cir. 1990) (recognizing that the transactional approach of the Restatement (Second) of
Judgments will generally consider a contract to be one transaction, so that resjudicata bars
all claims of contractual breach not brought in the original action unless the breach oc-
curred after the original action). Furthermore, although the exact scope of a transaction
for resjudicata purposes may be unclear, uncertainty is easy to avoid by asserting all claims
which might be precluded if not asserted. MichaelJ. Waggoner, Fifty Years of Bernhard v.
Bank of America is Enough: Collateral Estoppel Should Require Mutuality but Res udicata Should
Not 12 REv. LnrG. 891, 393 (1993).
133 This may not be true in the organized crimhe context, where defending criminal
charges may simply be a cost of doing business.
134 Transaction-basedjoinder requirements routinely exempt offenses for which the evi-
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from prosecuting it later, is a more likely objection. Here, a legislative
solution has an advantage over ajudicially fashioned rule. A statute is
announced in advance after input from the Department ofJustice and
federal prosecutors. The congressional enactment process should
provide sufficient information to avoid serious miscalculation or ex-
pansive judicial readings.
The existence of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines should also
ease the transition. Many federal offenses are subject to the Guide-
lines' grouping rules.'3 5 Consequently, in many subsequent prosecu-
tion scenarios, the additional punishment that the Guidelines
prescribe is not substantial. In addition, related crimes are often
swept into the punishment calculation under the relevant conduct
provision.13 6 As currently interpreted, the scope of the relevant con-
duct provision is slightly broader than the permissive joinder rule l3 7
that the federal courts employ.138 Thus, unless the prosecution simply
fails to recognize an additional offense as "relevant conduct" or the
offense is one of the few exempted from the relevant conduct re-
dence was not available when the prosecution commenced. See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE,
supra note 120, § 1.07(2) (referring to "known" offenses). Thus, this discussion focuses
exclusively on the prosecutor's failure to join a known offense as a result of confusion
regarding the scope of the rule.
135 To avoid unfair treatment that might result from count manipulation and aggrega-
tion, the Commission devised rules for grouping certain offense conduct into a single pun-
ishment. The grouping rules provide for an incremental punishment in multi-count
situations. See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 3D1.2. This theoretically prevents prosecutors from
charging a defendant with 10 counts of drug distribution and obtaining a sentence that is
10 times greater than a sentence following conviction for only one count of drug distribu-
tion. See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 1B1.3, Background Commentary ("The reference to
Section 3D1.2(d), which provides for grouping of multiple counts . . . prevents double
counting").
136 See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 1B1.3. For a discussion of the relevant conduct provi-
sion, see supra text accompanying note 76.
137 See FED. R CRIM. P. 8(a).
138 FED. R. CRiM. P. 8(a) governs thejoinder of offenses in the federal system. The rule
is fairly broad, allowingjoinder "if the offenses charged, . . . are of the same or similar
character or are based on the same act or transaction or on two or more acts or transac-
tions connected together of constituting parts of a common scheme or plan." According
to judge Wilkins, the Chairman of the Sentencing Commission, the relevant conduct provi-
sion encompasses acts outside the scope of rule 8:
The phrase "same course of conduct" as used in subsection [1B1.3] (a) (2), does not
have an exact counter point in Rule 8(a) .... The phrase, however, at least encom-
passes that portion of Rule 8(a) permittingjoinder of offenses that "are of the same or
similar character" or that involve "two or more acts or transactions connected to-
gether." The guideline term is broader than this analogous language, since it does
not require a connection between the acts in the form of an overall criminal scheme.
Rather, the guideline term contemplates that there be sufficient similarity in temporal
proximity to reasonably suggest that repeated instances of criminal behavior consti-
tutes a pattern of criminal conduct.
Wilkins & Steer, supra note 79, at 515-16 (footnotes omitted; emphasis in original).
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gime, 3 9 the prosecution may introduce an omitted offense at sentenc-
ing. Thus, the viable prosecutions lost due to the initial uncertainty of
a mandatory joinder rule should be minimal.
The third scenario, that the prosecution will overcompensate to
avoid problem two above, is also a realistic possibility. There is un-
doubtedly a point at which the prosecution is prejudiced by present-
ing too many counts. 140 The presentation of a large number of legally
unrelated charges that have some factual connection may confuse the
jury or generate hostility leading to an unacceptable compromise
verdict.
This is not a problem that is necessarily generated by uncertainty;
it could just as easily occur under a completely concretejoinder rule.
Uncertainty is a problem only if it induces the government to include
confusing or inappropriate offenses which are joinable under Rule
8(a),141 but which fall outside of the scope of the transaction em-
braced by the hypothetical joinder rule. Courts could handle
"overjoinder" of this sort by authorizing a government severance mo-
tion to determine whether the offense in question falls within thejoin-
der requirement. If the court finds that the prosecutor did not need
to include the offense at issue in the original indictment, it should
grant severance without a showing of prejudice by the government.142
From d policy point of view, uncertainty does not disqualify a fac-
tually driven compulsoryjoinder rule from use in the criminal system.
The balance appears to be similar to that in the civil context. Some
manipulation may occur to benefit the party towards whom the court
feels most sympathetic; some worthy claims will be lost in the begin-
ning; and some overjoinder problems may develop. None of these
problems seem particularly overwhelming in a statutory environment.
B. SOCIETV'S INTEREST IN CORRECTING "ERRORS"
It is more likely that society resists an act-based approach because
139 See supra text accompanying notes 84 to 89.
140 See Comment, supra note 10, at 293.
141 FED R. CM. P. 8(a).
142 Although such a severance mechanism would likely avoid prejudice to the govern-
ment, the prosecution may argue that disclosing other offenses potentially available at a
subsequent prosecution would prejudice its position. Undoubtedly, the government will
not want to disclose more of its case than absolutely necessary. On the other hand, if the
government believes even tangentially related offenses exist, it is hard to argue that the
prosecution should not tell the defendant as soon as possible. Remember, this is not a
scenario where the defendant has an opportunity to affect the additional counts. The
current indictment already contains charges based on conduct that arguably relates to the
charges in question. Potential prejudice from unnecessary disclosure is not sufficiently
problematic to warrant abandoning a compulsory joinder effort.
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it fears that the prosecutor or fact finder will make a "mistake," al-
lowing a guilty person to escape justice.14s An unacceptable verdict
may result from a variety of factors ranging from the incompetent
prosecutor or lenient judge to a racially biased jury. Unacceptable
verdicts will continue to occur under a mandatory joinder regime.
The question is whether these situations are sufficiently numerous
and dangerous to justify the serious individual and systemic costs at-
tendant to an unconstrained approach to successive prosecution.
1. Prosecutorial Error
The risk of the federal system failing to punish a factually guilty
person as a result of prosecutorial error' 44 does not demand the re-
tention of the successive prosecution power. As a general rule, the
federal prosecutor is sufficiently well-organized to prosecute effec-
tively. Assistant United States Attorneys typically boast excellent cre-
dentials and experience prior to government employment. 145 The
federal grand jury provides the prosecution with a powerful investiga-
tive tool, complete with nationwide subpoena power, to thoroughly
investigate the crime. 146 The offices get support from highly trained
and well-funded investigative organizations, such as the Federal Bu-
reau of Investigation and the Drug Enforcement Agency. 147 And the
fact that a crime usually must be "serious" before provoking federal
attention 148 likely avoids the dramatic "underprosecutions" that some-
times result from overlapping jurisdiction' 49 between the traffic divi-
sion, for example, and the felony unit in a single state office. 150
143 Comment, supra note 10, at 288 ("The chiefjustification offered for reprosecuting
on reserved counts after an acquittal is that there was a 'mistake' prejudicial to the state at
the first trial.").
144 This discussion focuses exclusively on the prosecutor's failure to adequately pursue
known offenses. Newly discovered offenses are typically excluded from the scope of
mandatory joinder requirements as are offenses which have not been completed at the
time of prosecution. Thus, defendants cannot escape punishment by successfully hiding a
crime, nor will they escape criminal liability, for instance, if their victim dies after the gov-
ernment has prosecuted them for assault.
145 See EISENSTEIN, supra note 38, at 109.
146 See LAFAvE & ISRAEL, supra note 53, at 382-84.
147 The annual federal drug control budget alone amounted to over $12.2 billion. This
figure includes all drug related efforts, such as prevention, treatment, etc. UNrrED STATES
DEP'T OFJUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINALJUSrICE STATISTICS 1992, at 19-21 (1993).
148 See Frase, supra note 40, at 262-65.
149 The United States Attorney's office in the District of Columbia is responsible for
prosecuting general crimes in the District. Because this office may have special divisions
much like a state prosecutorial unit, special rules may be necessary for the D.C. office to
avoid serious underprosecutions resulting from misdemeanor/felony distinctions and the
like.
150 Grady v. Corbin, 495 U.S. 508 (1990), provides a good example of the problem. The
traffic or misdemeanor division first prosecuted the defendant for reckless driving. Subse-
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In addition, the procedural climate in which the government pur-
sues federal crimes is fairly forgiving of prosecutorial errors. Prosecu-
tors may add related offenses to an indictment before trial with
relative ease.15' Additionally, if the court dismisses the entire indict-
ment for defects.in the description of offenses, the prosecutor may
present the evidence to a second grand jury.152 The Guidelines also
provide a zone of comfort by allowing post-conviction adjustments,
thus diminishing the impact of pleading and presentation decisions
on sentence severity.' 5 3
The general competence of the federal prosecutor, the resources
devoted to investigative assistance, the structure of the offices, and the
procedural climate in which federal crimes are litigated should insu-
late the system from serious prosecutorial missteps. The risk that dan-
gerous criminals will escape justice as the result of prosecutorial
incompetence in the federal system seems remote. Contrasted with
the potential costs associated with duplicative criminal proceedings,
the occasional prosecutorial mistake is not serious enough to warrant
a wide-open approach to successive prosecution.
2. Fact Finder Error
Condoning reprosecution in cases of fact finder "error" is even
more troubling. Decisions by either the judge or the jury may gener-
quently, a grand jury charged him with manslaughter. The Supreme Court barred the
second prosecution on Double Jeopardy grounds. Id. at 510.
151 Although the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure do not specifically authorize su-
perseding indictments, federal prosecutors routinely file them. United States v. Frechette,
1990 WL 3184 at *3 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 9, 1990). As a general rule, a superseding indictment
will not extend the government's time to bring the defendant to trial under the Speedy
Trial Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 3161 (1988). "The government may seek a superseding indict-
ment which adds new charges or corrects errors in the original indictment at any time up
to the time of trial." Frechette, 1990 WL at *3; United States v. Fisher, 871 F.2d 444, 452 (3d
Cir. 1989). However, if the grandjury returns a superseding indictment so close to trial as
to prejudice the defendant, the District Court should grant an "ends of justice" continu-
ance to allow defendant's counsel adequate preparation time. See United States v. Rojas-
Contreras, 474 U.S. 231, 237 (1985). The defendant's burden to show "prejudice" will be
difficult to overcome in most cases. See, e.g., United States v. Grossman, 843 F.2d 78 (2d
Cir. 1988) (holding that a superseding indictment, which the government filed two days
before trial, and which added 10 counts to the previous indictment involving new transac-
tions, did not prejudice the defendant).
152 See SARA S. BEALE & WIuIAM C. BRYSON, GRAND JURY LAW An PRACTICE § 6:41 (1986)
(noting that "double jeopardy poses no bar to resubmission because the grand jury has
determined only that the evidence presented did not establish probable cause to indict the
accused"); LAFAVE & IsRAEL, supra note 53, at 692 ("The longstanding federal rule is that
resubmissions are permissible, Aithout court approval, even when the prosecutor presents
no additional evidence to the second grand jury.").
153 For a description of the Guidelines' mechanisms facilitating the correction of
prosecutorial errors, see supra text accompanying notes 78 to 82.
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ate an unacceptable verdict. Such verdicts are an unavoidable by-
product of a system committed to an independentjudiciary and a rep-
resentative jury. 54 Thus, the question is whether such inevitable
events warrant the retention of an unrestricted successive prosecution
power. Generally, they do not.
The key difficulty in allowing reprosecution to remedy fact finder
error is that there is no suitable method of identifying an "error." As
the author of the seminal Double Jeopardy analysis Twice inJeopardy' 5
noted, the current approach "allows the prosecutor to decide whether
he was defeated fairly."' 56 Prosecutors are, of course, the least objec-
tive government officials available to make this decision. Regardless
of their ethical duty to "do justice," 57 they are adversaries and un-
doubtedly believe completely in the righteousness of their cause.
a. Judicial Error
In many instances in which the prosecutor identifies the judiciary
as the source of the "error," an objective judicial assessment of the
accuracy of the decision in question is already available. The govern-
ment may appeal critical pretrial suppression and exclusion orders. 58
Thus, in situations in which the government believes that the verdict is
inaccurate because the court limited the scope of the jury's inquiry by
granting a suppression order, the prosecution has the opportunity to
litigate the accuracy of the offending decision before trial. If the or-
der is upheld on appeal, the unacceptable verdict stems not from "er-
ror" but from the fact that the defendant is not legally guilty of the
offense at issue. Thus, the prosecutor's complaint is not with the fact
finder, but with the Constitution. There is simply no basis for al-
lowing the executive to second guess this decision through
reprosecution.
Evidentiary decisions made during the trial remain unreviewable
154 Professor Thomas eloquently argues this point in the Double Jeopardy context:
Because the question for the criminal justice system is necessarily legal guilt, rather
than whether X did Y, the system must prefer the judgement of the fact finder to that
of the prosecutor. Because this is so, it is nonsensical to speak of the prosecutor cor-
recting "errors" made by the fact finder. The fact finder's judgment is the defendant's
culpability. Thus, the double jeopardy clause is simply an inevitable part of the system
that gives the ultimate decision-making responsibility to the fact finder.
Thomas, supra note 18, at 835.
155 See Comment, supra note 10, which remains to this day one of most compelling
critiques of the DoubleJeopardy protection ever written.
156 Id. at 290.
157 A.BA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINALJUSTICE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND DEFENSE FUNC-
TION 3-1.2(c) (3d ed. 1993).
158 18 U.S.C. § 3731 (1988) allows the United States to appeal, inter alia, judicial deci-
sions dismissing indictments, ordering new trials after verdict, and suppressing or exclud-
ing evidence before trial.
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in the event of an acquittal. Such decisions may conceivably account
for a "technically inaccurate" verdict. It is doubtful, however, that
such situations occur frequently enough to justify a reprosecution
remedy. In cases involving close, critical evidentiary decisions, the
court has every incentive to rule in the government's favor. The fed-
eral bench has no more desire than the general public to see a factu-
ally guilty defendant escape justice. Resolving such disputes in favor
of the government allows the case to proceed to conviction while still
allowing the defendant to appeal the ruling. If the decision was in
error, the appellate court may remand the case for retrial without the
evidence in question.
Although not technically attributable to "fact finder" error,
sentences which the prosecution perceives to be too lenient may also
fuel the government's desire to reprosecute. This perception may
also be tested objectively in the courts of appeal. One of the best char-
acteristics of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines is the right to contest
the accuracy of the sentence.15 9 For example, an incorrect interpreta-
tion of the scope of the relevant conduct provision, or a failure to
account for obstruction of justice may be remedied on appeal. Simi-
larly, both the propriety and extent of a decision to depart downward
are subject to review. 160 Thus, in situations in -which the judge cor-
rectly applied the Guidelines, prosecutorial claims of an inadequate
sentence may simply mask a disagreement with Congress regarding
appropriate prison terms.
b. Jury Error
The jury may acquit or compromise in the face of what the prose-
cutor believes to be overwhelming evidence of guilt. But allowing the
government to reprosecute in the face of a hostile jury verdict is anti-
thetical to the entire theory of community control over the content
and use of the criminal sanction. The jury lies at the heart of the
constitutional system ofjustice;16' it stands as a "safeguard against the
corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and against the compliant, biased,
or eccentric judge."16 2 Allowing the government unrestricted access
to the successive prosecution power renders hollow the promise of
159 See 18 U.S.C. § 8742 (1988 & Supp. V. 1994); HUTCHINSON & YELLEN, supra note 82,
§ 9.1.
160 Courts review the propriety of departure de novo, while they review the extent of
departure for "reasonableness." 18 U.S.C. 3742(f) (1)-(2) (1988); See also HUTCHINSON &
YELLEN, supra note 82, §§ 9.2, 9.4.
161 See Arnar, supra note 99, at 1183 ("The dominant strategy to keep agents of the cen-
tral government under control was to use the populist and local institution of the jury.");
Lear, supra note 78, at 1223-28.
162 Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968).
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protection from the "corrupt or overzealous" prosecutor.
c. The Egregious Outcome
It is impossible to talk about fact finder "error" without address-
ing the acquittal and subsequent retrial in the Rodney King case.' 63
Although that case presented a dual sovereignty problem beyond the
scope of this Article, 64 such a situation could occur as the result of a
failed federal prosecution. The question is whether the government
must retain the successive prosecution power specifically to remedy
civil unrest caused by the perception that justice has not been done.
The argument is similar to that advanced in favor of the pardon
power.' 65 Enlightenment philosophers condemned the pardon
power as an illegitimate exercise of power inconsistent with democ-
racy.' 66 Yet, the Framers of the Constitution found it essential to sta-
163 On 29 April 1992, a California state jury acquitted three of four Los Angeles Police
Officers accused of brutally beating Rodney King. Richard A. Serrano & Tracy Wilkinson,
All Four in King BeatingAcquitted, L.A. TIMES, Apr. 3, 1992, atAl. Thejury could not reach
a verdict on the charge of assault under color of authority against Officer Laurence M.
Powell. Id. The venue for the King case moved from a location in Los Angeles County to
predominately white Los Angeles suburb of Simi Valley. Martin Berg, D.A.'s Actions on King
Venue are Questioned, LA DAiLYJ., May 7, 1992, at 1. The Simi Valley jury was composed of
10 whites, a Latin-American, and an Asian-American. Richard A. Serrano & Carlos V.
Lozano, Jury Picked for King Trial; No Blatks Chosen, LA TIMES, Mar. 3, 1992, at Al. The
jury's verdict was widely denounced as a failure of the criminal justice system. SeeLaurie L.
Levenson, The Future of State and Federal Civil Rights Prosecutions: The Lessons of the Rodney
King Tria, 41 UCLA L. REv. 509, 528 n.101 (1994). Approximately three months after the
Simi Valley verdict, a federal grand jury returned an indictment against all four officers for
alleged civil rights violations. Id. at 528.
164 According to the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine, the Double Jeopardy Clause does not
prohibit a second prosecution for an identical offense if pursued by a separate sovereign.
Thus, double jeopardy theoretically has no application in a reprosecution by state authori-
ties after a federal acquittal, and vice versa. See Abbate v. United States, 359 U.S. 187
(1959); Bartkus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959). The vast majority of doublejeopardy schol-
ars have condemned this position. See Susan N. Herman, Double Jeopardy All Over Again:
Dual Sovereignty, Rodney King and the ACLU, 41 UCLA L. REv. 609, 618 (1994); Paul Hoff-
man, DoubleJeopardy Wars: The Casefor a Civil Rights "Exception, "41 UCLA L. REv. 649, 651 &
n.11 (1994). The retrial in the Rodney King case was particularly troublesome to groups
such as the ACLU, which have traditionally deplored the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine as
unconstitutional. The national ACLU condemned the second trial of the LA police of-
ficers, while the Southern California chapter of the ACLU argued that retrial was defensi-
ble in the civil rights context. See id. at 659-78.
165 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 provides in pertinent part: "The President shall ... have Power
to grand Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of
Impeachment." Id.
166 For example, Montesquieu argued that the pardon power was an unjustifiable inter-
ference with the people's right to punish and could therefore not exist in a republic. See
KATHLEEN DESAN MOORE, PARDONS: JUSTICE, MERCY AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST 24 (1989).
Immanuel Kant is perhaps most famous for his condemnation of the pardon power. See id.
at 28 (1989). Kant argued that the pardon power was not only a usurpation of the rights of
the community, but was a breach of moral law because the community had failed in its
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bility.167 A government, to survive, must have the ability to forgive
rebellion and bring dissidents back into the fold.168
The same argument might apply to the successive prosecution
power. The government must have a way to respond to widespread
dissatisfaction with a jury verdict. Otherwise, it risks a breakdown of
the law and the resulting vigilantism and political disaffection charac-
terizing Los Angeles after the Simi Valley acquittals. 169 The United
States is no stranger to jury nullification in racially charged cases.' 70
Perhaps this history requires the retention of a broad successive prose-
cution power.
The problem with this position is that the power retained is un-
necessarily broad and unusually dangerous. In the case of the pardon
power, the temptation to use it is low, while the political price for
duty to punish an offender. Id.
Blackstone shared the view that the pardon power and democracy were inconsistent.
4 WituAM Bi.AcKsToNE, CoMMEaNTA iEs *483 ("In a pure democracy, this power of pardon-
ing cannot subsist; for there nothing higher is acknowledged than the magistrate who ad-
ministers the laws.").
167 Professor Moore suggests that the Framers "were more inclined to see the pardon as
an instrument of law enforcement than an act of grace. Thus, they were more concerned
with making the pardon power work than with making it conform to philosophical presup-
positions about democracy." MooRE, supra note 166, at 25. Note that the French experi-
ment without a pardon power in the wake of the French Revolution was entirely
unsuccessful. "France found that it could not get along without some machinery for clem-
ency .... " Id. Professor Moore concludes by pointing out that "no other regime in the
world has been without a clemency power of some sort." Id.
168 As Hamilton explained in THE FEDmEAuSr,
in seasons of insurrection and rebellion, there are often critical moments, when a well-
timed offer of pardon to the insurgents or rebels may restore the tranquility of the
commonwealth; and which if suffered to pass unimproved, it may never be possible
afterwards to recall.
MOORE, supra note 166, at 26 (quoting ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 74).
This theory was tested in 1794, when President Washington summoned the army to quell
the Whiskey Rebellion in Pennsylvania. After routing the rebels (they ran into the hills in
the face of the oncoming army), President Washington pardoned them all, saying
For though I shall always think it a sacred duty to exercise with firmness and energy
the constitutional powers with which I am vested, yet it appears to me no less consis-
tent with the public good than it is with my own feelings to mingle the operations of
Government every degree of moderation and tenderness which the national justice
and safety permit.
MooRE, supra note 166, at 27 (quoting UNrrw STATES PRmENTIAL CLEMENCY BoARDt,
1975, at 356).
169 Immediately following the Simi Valley acquittals of the four Los Angeles Police Of-
ficers accused of brutalizing Rodney King, Los Angeles erupted into four days of intense
rioting. Greg Braxton &Jim Newton, Looting andFires Ravage LA., L.. TIMES May 1, 1992,
at Al.
170 Many of the causes of action authorized by the Civil Rights Acts of 1871 were in
response to the inability ofAfrican-American citizens to obtainjustice in the southern state
courts following the Civil War. See ERWIN CHEMERINSIY, FEDERALJURISDICTION § 8.2 (2d ed.
1994).
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overuse is high. 7 1 The opposite is true for successive prosecution.
The temptation to harass those believed to be guilty is high. Prosecu-
tors can easily believe that reprosecution is the "right" thing, that they
are seeking "justice." The political price for such actions is low, and in
high profile cases, the majority of the public, convinced that criminals
are getting off scot free, will applaud. 172
Moreover, the Dual Sovereignty Doctrine1 73 may already provide
an adequate method for redressing an egregious outcome. It seems
unlikely that a disappointing verdict in a huge federal antitrust prose-
cution or far-flung racketeering case will engender popular responses
necessitating retention of the successive prosecution power in the fed-
eral system. The cases most likely to provoke extreme reactions are
those that strike closer to home-police brutality, mass murder, child
molestation, or flag burning. The federal criminal code will address
only a few situations of this type, and a state criminal prosecution will
usually be available should the federal prosecution fall. Given the
availability in many cases of a subsequent state prosecution, resisting
compulsory joinder on the ground that social upheaval stemming
from an unpopular verdict cannot be addressed seems entirely
misguided.
Even assuming that the government must retain the ability to rep-
rosecute in the egregious case, the power should be carefully con-
trolled to protect defendants and the system from abuse. Here again,
a statutory approach to a mandatory joinder rule has its advantages.
The law could forbid reprosecution, without a specific triggering
event, such as the express approval of the Attorney General, or limit it
to a group of cases in which an egregious verdict is most likely to pro-
duce civil discord. Although it is not clear that reprosecution after an
unacceptable verdict is the best response to system failures of this sort,
crafting a narrow statutory exception for such instances is preferable
to vesting the government with an unfettered successive prosecution
171 Professor Moore contends that "President Ford's pardon of Richard Nixon may have
cost him reelection [and that] several Governors have been impeached or driven from
office for abusing their power to pardon." MooRE, supra note 166, at 7. Interestingly,
Moore points out that "[t]he papal abuse of indulgences-the high price sinners were
required to pay to the church for divine forgiveness-was one of the factors that led to the
Protestant Reformation and the subsequent political upheaval in Europe." Id.
172 This attitude may account for the acquittals in the King beating trial. Many of the
Simi Valley jurors revealed a possible pro-police bias during voir dire. Levenson, supra
note 163, at 525 n.85. The comments from the jurors about police officers included:
"They try to do a good job in difficult times," "it takes a special kind of person to make a
good officer," and "they have to make a lot of life-threateningjudgments and they do a lot
with the community. But you don't hear about that." Serrano & Lozano, supra note 163,
at A19.
173 See supra note 164 and accompanying text.
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power.
IV. IMAGINING COMPULSORYJOINDER IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
Although scholars have long debated the constitutional necessity
of a compulsoryjoinder requirement, little has been written regarding
the practical aspects of implementing such a rule. The following ob-
servations are offered in the hope of expanding the transaction rule
debate to include discussion of the pragmatic difficulties inherent in
the adoption of a factually driven joinder rule in the federal system.
The purpose of these remarks is not to develop a specific proposal.
Commentators have advanced a vast number of thoughtful formula-
tions describing the criminal transaction in expanding degrees of de-
tail.'7 4 At least twenty-three states are currently operating under some
version of a transaction-based compulsory joinder regime175 Thus,
174 See, e.g., STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE, supra note 121, § 1.3;
MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 13, § 1.07; Thomas, supra note 10, at 398-99 (advocating
the conduct based test ultimately adopted in Grady v. Corbin); Reintroducing evidence
(suggesting a standard based on actual evidence used at the first trial); Comment, supra
note 10, at 262 (contending that double jeopardy requires the joinder of all joinable
offenses).
175 The 23 states are: Alaska: State v. Williams, 730 P.2d 806, 807 (Alaska 1987) (dis-
missing tampering with evidence indictment where the prosecution used essentially the
same evidence used in an attempt to convict the defendant of murder); Arkansas: Am. R.
Cr0M. P. 21.3 (when charged with two or more related offenses, defendant may move to
join them for trial and the court shall grant the motion unless it determines that because
the prosecuting attorney does not have sufficient evidence to warrant trying some of the
offenses at the same time, or for some other reason an injustice would occur if it granted
the motion); California: CAL. PENAL CODE § 654 (West 1988) (in no case is an act or omis-
sion which is made punishable in different ways by different provisions to be punished
more than once; an acquittal or conviction and sentence under a provision of the code
bars a prosecution for the same act or omission under any other); Colorado: COLO. Ruv.
STAT. ANN. § 18-1-408(2) (West 1986) ("If several offenses are known to the district attor-
ney at the time of commencing the prosecution and were committed within his judicial
district, all such offenses upon which the district attorney elects to proceed must be prose-
cuted by separate counts in a single prosecution if they are based on the same act or series
of acts arising from the same criminal episode."); Florida: FLA. R. CRUM. P. 3.151(b) ("Two
or more indictments or informations charging related offenses shall be consolidated for
trial on a timely motion by a defendant or by the state."); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-7
(1990) ("If the several crimes arising from the same conduct are known to the proper
prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within thejurisdic-
tion of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution except..." that in
the interest ofjustice the court may order that one or more of such charges be tried sepa-
rately); Hawaii: HAw. REV. STAT. § 701-109(2) (1985) ("a defendant shall not be subject to
separate trials for multiple offenses based on the same conduct or arising from the same
episode, if such offenses are known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of
the commencement of the first trial and are within the jurisdiction of a single court");
Illinois: 720 ILGS 5/3-3 (Michie 1993) ("if the several offenses are known to the proper
prosecuting officer at the time of commencing the prosecution and are within the jurisdic-
tion of a single court, they must be prosecuted in a single prosecution" if they are based on
the same act, "unless the court in the interest ofjustice orders that one or more of such
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charges shall be tried separately"); Maine: ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 14 (West 1993)
("A defendant shall not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses based on the
same conduct or arising from the same criminal episode, if such offense were known to the
appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of the commencement of the first trial and
were within the jurisdiction of the same court and within the same venue, unless the court,
on application of the prosecuting attorney or of the defendant or on its own motion, or-
ders any such charge to be tried separately if it is satisfied thatjustice so requires."); Massa-
chusetts: MASS. R. CIM. P. 9 ("If a defendant is charged with two or more related offenses,
either party may move for joinder of such charges. The trial judge shall join the charges
for trial unless he determines thatjoinder is not in the best interests ofjustice."); Michigan:
People v. White, 212 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Mich. 1973) (adopting same transaction test as
outlined in the concurring opinion ofJustice Brennan in Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436,
488 (1970)); Minnesota: MrNN. STAT. § 609.035 (1983) ("if a person's conduct constitutes
more than one offense under the laws of this state, the person may be punished for only
one of the offenses and a conviction or acquittal of any one of them is a bar to prosecution
for any other of them. All offenses, if prosecuted, shall be included in one prosecution
which shall be stated in separate counts."); Montana: Morr. CODE ANN. § 46-11-503(1)
(1991) ("When two or more offenses are known to the prosecutor, are supported by prob-
able cause, and are consummated prior to the original charge and jurisdiction and venue
of the offenses lie in a single court, a prosecution is barred if. (a) the former prosecution
resulted in an acquittal.... (b) the former prosecution resulted in a conviction that has
not been set aside, reversed, or vacated"); NewJersey: N.J. R. GRIM. P. 3:15-3 (court shall
join any pending non-indictable complaint for trial with a criminal offense based on the
same conduct or arising from the same episode; however, if it appears that the joinder
prejudices a defendant or the State, the court may decline to join or may grant other
appropriate relief); New York: N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW. § 40.40 (McKinney 1992) ("Where
two or more offenses are joinable in a single accusatory instrument against a person by
reason of being based upon the same criminal transaction.., such person may not ... be
separately prosecuted for such offenses even though such separate prosecutions are not
otherwise barred by any other section of this article."); North Carolina: N.C. GE. STAT.
§ 15A-926 (1994) ("When a defendant has been charged with two or more offenses [based
on the same act or transaction or a series of acts or transactions connected together or
constituting parts of a single scheme or plan) his timely motion to join them for trial must
be granted unless the court determines that because the prosecutor does not have suffi-
cient evidence to warrant trying some of the offenses at that time or if, for some other
reason, the ends ofjustice would be defeated if the motion were granted."); Oregon: OR.
REv. STAT. § 131.515 (1993) ("No person shall be separately prosecuted for two or more
offenses based upon the same criminal episode, if the several offenses are reasonably
known to the appropriate prosecutor at the time of commencement of the first prosecu-
tion and establish proper venue in a single court."); Pennsylvania: 18 PA. CONS. STAT.
§ 110 (1983) ("Although a prosecution is for a violation of a different provision of the
statutes than a former prosecution or is based on different facts, it is barred by such former
prosecution... [when the subsequent offense is] based on the same conduct or arising
from the same criminal episode, if such offense was known to the appropriate prosecuting
officer at the time of commencement of the first trial and was within the jurisdiction of a
single court unless the court ordered separate trial of the charge of such offense"); Tennes-
see: State v. Covington, 222 S.W. 1, 2 (Tenn. 1920) (same transaction test applied); Texas:
Quitzow v. State, I Tex. Grim. 47, 53-4 (Tex. 1876) ("The prosecutor had a right to carve as
large an offense out of this transaction as he could, yet must cut only once"); Utah: UTAH
CODE ANN. § 76-1-403 (1990) ("If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more of-
fenses arising out of a single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a
different offense arising out of the same criminal episode is barred if: (a) The subsequent
prosecution is for an offense that was or should have been tried under Subsection 76-1-
402(2)"); Washington: WASH. SUPER. CT. CIUM. R. 4.3 ("When a defendant has been
charged with two or more related offenses, the timely motion to join them for trial should
1995] SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION PHFENOMENON 667
the varying options for scope and wording are already available. What
follows are a few ideas dealing with the unique problems in the fed-
eral system-problems that any statutory effort must address, regard-
less of the scope of the joinder rule adopted.
A. VENUE
Any compulsory joinder effort in the federal system must deal
with the multi-district character of federal crimes. Because venue is a
major impediment to a consolidated prosecution, a federal compul-
sory joinder statute should contain either a venue waiver or stipula-
tion provision. 176 A number of procedural rules implicating
constitutional rights treat the failure to object within a certain time
frame as a waiver of that right.177 A stipulation scheme might be pref-
erable to a waiver procedure, simply because it would avoid inadver-
tent waivers. A stipulation arrangement could require prosecutors to
submit a venue statement with each count, allowing the defense to
stipulate to a trial of the offense in that district, or to object and de-
fend the charges separately.
Either scenario will require certain safeguards to avoid
prosecutorial advantage-taking. One obvious danger in a multi-venue
offense situation is that the prosecution may file the case in an incon-
venient location. 78 Courts rarely grant motions to change venue, 179
be granted unless the court determines that because the prosecuting attorney does not
have sufficient evidence to warrant trying some of the offenses at that time, or for some
other reason, the ends ofjustice would be defeated if the motion were granted."); West
Virginia: State v. Robinson, 257 S.E.2d 167, 170 (W. Va. 1979) (adopting both "same evi-
dence" test and "same transaction" test).
Although Alabama has a statute purporting to adopt a transaction rule, see AiA. CODE
§ 15-3-8 (1982) ("Any act or omission declared criminal and punishable in different ways
by different provisions of law shall be punished only under one of such provisions, and a
conviction or acquittal under any one shall bar a prosecution for the same act or omission
under any other provision."), courts apply it in the same manner as the Blockburger test.
176 No constitutional obstacle to such a scheme is apparent. Even though waiver of a
constitutional right must theoretically be "knowing and intelligent," courts routinely hold
that defendants have forfeited their constitutional rights when they fail to make evidentiary
objections or miss filing deadlines. See, e.g., Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977) (refus-
ing to review habeas corpus petitioner's Miranda claim on the ground that defendant had
failed to raise the issue at trial); Engle v. Issac, 456 U.S. 107 (1982) (refusing to review
habeas corpus petitioner's Winship claim on the ground that the defendant had failed to
raise the issue at trial).
177 See, e.g., FED. R. Crv. P. 38(b) (requiring party to demand ajury trial within 10 days of
the last pleading establishing the jury right); FD. R. CGiM. P. 12(f) (failure of a party to
raise defenses or objections or to make requests which it must make prior to trial will
constitute waiver if the party does not make them within the time the court prescribes).
178 "[T]he crime-committed formula will not always produce the most convenient forum
from the defendant's perspective, especially when the offense is committed in more than
one place and the prosecution has a choice of districts."- LAFAvE & IsRAEn, supra note 53, at
747.
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leaving the defense with the option of litigating in the inconvenient
district or declining to waive venue and defending in several districts.
Requiring the prosecution to file the indictment in the district encom-
passing the most serious crime as defined by potential sentencing ex-
posure might avoid this problem. 80 Alternatively, the current
standards for change of venue could be modified to include a less
stringent inquiry in the multi-venue scenario.
B. CENTRAL COORDINATION AND OVERSIGHT
Establishing a central clearing mechanism to assist the districts in
determining whether other investigations of subjects and targets are
ongoing should be not be difficult in the computer era. Once the
Department of Justice determines that related investigations are pro-
ceeding, it may assign the prosecution to a particular office. An inevi-
table casualty of centralization will be the ability of the U.S. Attorneys
to respond consistently to local concerns, and the Department will
need to be sensitive to such concerns when selecting districts for
consolidation.
C. SUCCESSIVE PROSECUTION BASED ON NEW EVIDENCE
Drafting an exception for prosecutions based on evidence discov-
ered after the initiation of the initial prosecution will be particularly
challenging in the federal environment. Embracing too forgiving of a
standard will undermine the entire enterprise, yet too strict an ap-
proach will unduly hamper legitimate prosecution. Thus, where one
draws the line is extremely important.
The Model Penal Code's formula, which a number of states have
179 FED. R. CRIM. P. 21 (b) provides in pertinent part: "[f]or the convenience of parties
and witnesses, and in the interest ofjustice, the court upon motion of the defendant may
transfer the proceeding as to that defendant or any one or more of the counts thereof to
another district." Trial courts have broad discretion to transfer a case and may consider a
wide range of factors in the determination. See Platt v. Minnesota Mining & Mfg., 376 U.S.
240, 243-44 (1964). The Platt Court recognized nine factors trial courts frequently rely
upon: "(1) location of... defendant; (2) location of possible witnesses; (3) location of
events likely to be at issue; (4) location of documents and records likely to be involved; (5)
disruption of defendant's business unless the case is transferred; (6) expense to the parties;
(7) location of counsel; (8) relative accessibility of place of trial; and (9) docket condition
of each district or division involved." Id. Appellate courts review the denial of motion to
transfer venue under Rule 21(b) under the abuse of discretion standard. E.g., United
States v. Parker, 877 F.2d 327, 331 (5th Cir. 1989); United States v. Hueftle, 687 F.2d 1305,
1309-10 (10th Cir. 1982). Defendants rarely succeed on appeal. See, e.g., id.
180 If sentencing exposure is the determinative factor, it should be judged by reference
to the Guidelines as opposed to the statute at issue. Many federal offenses contain ex-
tremely high maxima, which in no way correspond to the likely sentence under the
Guidelines.
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adopted,18' provides a good point from which to launch the debate.
Under this approach, the government needs to join only those of-
fenses "known to the appropriate prosecuting officer at the time of
the commencement of the first trial .... s182 This formula raises three
critical questions for the federal system: how the system should deter-
mine if the appropriate federal prosecutor knows about an offense;
the standard courts should use to evaluate claims of prosecutorial ig-
norance; and whether the "commencement of trial" provides an ap-
propriate triggering point for the federal system.
At the very least, knowledge should be attributed to the federal
prosecutorial unit only after an actual AUSA has received the informa-
tion. Thus, like most of the states, the federal system should not
equate knowledge on the part of law enforcement or other investiga-
tive agencies with prosecutorial knowledge. Beyond this point, the
question becomes more difficult. If a compulsory joinder rule is to
have any real impact on system-wide redundancy, it must equate the
possession of new evidence by any AUSA in the system with possession
by the prosecuting district. Absent this broad attribution standard, a
statutoryjoinder requirement will do little more than supplement the
Petite Policy, preventing primarily intra-district reprosecution. The
government will have to develop an effective means of distributing
relevant information to the investigating districts. Therefore, the
commitment of the Department of Justice to the scheme is critical.
Determining the standard by which courts should evaluate
prosecutorial claims of new evidence is similarly problematic. The
prosecution must have the burden of demonstrating that a lack of evi-
dence supporting the proposed charge prevented its inclusion in the
original indictment. The defendant has no way of establishing the
extent of the prosecutor's knowledge. The difficulty emerges in as-
sessing whether sufficient evidence of the offense in question was
available to the prosecution in the initial case. Anyjudicial determina-
tion may collide with the traditional charging discretion lodged with
the prosecutor. Judges have long excused themselves from judgments
of this sort on the ground that such decisions are beyond the compe-
tence of the bench: "Few subjects are less adapted to judicial review
than the exercise of the Executive of his discretion in deciding when
and whether to institute criminal proceedings .... .18 3 But allowing
the prosecutor to be the sole judge of the question leaves the system
181 See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 16-1-7 (1990); 720 ILCS 5/3-3 (Michie 1993); ME. REv.
STAT. ANN. tit. 17-A, § 14 (West 1993).
182 MODEL PENAL CODE, supra note 120, § 1.07(2).
183 Newman v. United States, 382 F.2d 479, 480 (D.C. Cir. 1967); see also SarahJ. Cox,
Prosecutorial Discretion: An Overview, 13 AM. CRiM. L. REv. 383, 389 (1976).
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open to manipulation.
Clearly, courts should bar new charges supported by facts set
forth in the original indictment. The judge seems similarly compe-
tent to review the date that the "new" evidence became available, and
whether reasonable diligence could have turned up such evidence in
the first proceeding. Courts, however, will have to honor
prosecutorial judgment regarding the level of evidence necessary to
proceed, if only to avoid increasing judicial oversight to a point that
efficiency gains from a joinder rule are lost.
Lastly, note that the Model Penal Code formula requires thejoin-
der of offenses known before the "commencement of trial." The bet-
ter approach is probably to consider the matter closed once the
government files an indictment. Both the prosecution and the de-
fense need preparation time in the event the government files a su-
perseding indictment. The Speedy Trial Act allows only seventy days
between indictment and trial,'8 thus compressing the time to resub-
mit an indictment without prejudicing the defendant. Admittedly,
keying the joinder requirement to the indictment date leaves open
the real possibility of prosecutorial manipulation. But equating
knowledge of an offense with the ability to prosecute it at an upcom-
ing trial seems unrealistic in the extreme.
D. SEVERANCE
A mandatory joinder rule will increase the instances in which a
severance remedy may be necessary. As noted, the inherent uncer-
tainty of any joinder requirement may cause the prosecutor to join
related offenses that could legitimately be pursued in a separate pros-
ecution. The government should therefore have access to a prophy-
lactic motion to assess the necessity ofjoining the counts in question.
Once a court finds that the offenses at issue are outside the scope of
the joinder requirement, it should grant severance as a matter of
right.
A government severance motion should also be available to rem-
edy situations in which the number and nature of the charges, rather
than uncertainty regarding the scope of the joinder rule, are the
source of potential prejudice to the prosecution. 11 But obtaining sev-
erance in such a scenario should require proof of actual prejudice, as
opposed to mere preference, on the part of the government. Failure
184 18 U.S.C. § 3161(c)(1) (1988).
185 The practical significance of this problem may be minimal, because the Guidelines
limit the impact of charging decisions by accounting for related offenses at sentencing. See
supra text accompanying notes 78 to 82.
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to insist upon a high burden will allow prosecutors to undermine any
efficiency gains envisioned by ajoinder requirement.
The very fact of a mandatoryjoinder rule, regardless of its defini-
tional difficulties, may adversely affect the defendant. The problem
from a defense perspective derives from the cumulative impact on the
jury of an extensive indictment containing an enormous number of
related or overlapping accusations. A factually driven compulsory
joinder rule will undoubtedly increase defendants' exposure to this
problem. Severance is theoretically available under Rule 14186 upon
proof of substantial prejudice. Substantial prejudice, however, is ex-
tremely difficult to demonstrate prior to trial, and defendants have
not fared well under this rule. 8 7 Some loosening of the standard will
be necessary to counter an increase in the number of charges rou-
tinely included in a single indictment, regardless of whether this in-
crease is the result of prosecutorial uncertainty or simply compliance
with a single-indictment requirement. 88
E. RELATIONSHIP TO SENTENCING GUIDELINES
The Guidelines are generally compatible with a compulsoryjoin-
der requirement. The Guidelines soften the impact of deficits in
prosecutorial judgment and fact finder "mistakes" by providing a
mechanism to punish defendants for unindicted or unconvicted of-
186 FED. R- CRIM. P. 14.
187 Parties must show substantial prejudice to warrant severing trials under Rule 14.
United States v. Werner, 620 F.2d 922, 928 (2d Cir. 1980); see also United States v. Barrett,
505 F.2d 1091, 1106 (7th Cir. 1974) ("Obviously any adding of offenses to others is prejudi-
cial to some extent."), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 964 (1975). Professors LaFave & Israel, supra
note 53, at 764, have noted that "[d]efendants generally have not fared very well under
rules and statutes which permit them to obtain a severance of offenses only upon proof of
prejudice." The prejudice issue involves speculation about things that may or may not
occur, it is difficult for the trial judge to make a finding on prejudice before trial. Further,
judges are "reluctant to make a finding of prejudice during trial, after the prosecution has
put in most or all of its proof." Id.
And it is "virtually impossible for the defendant to prevail on appeal," id., under the
abuse of discretion test. United States v. Armstrong, 621 F.2d 951, 954 (9th Cir. 1980)
(recognizing "joinder is the rule rather than the exception and... the burden is on the
defendant in his appeal following denial of the motion to sever to show thatjoinder was so
manifestly prejudicial that it outweighed the dominant concern with judicial economy and
compel exercise of the court's discretion to sever.") (citing United States v. Brashier, 548
F.2d 1315, 1323 (9th Cir. 1976)). For a more in-depth discussion ofjoinder and severance
under Rules 8 and 14, see Note, Joint and Single Trials Under Rules 8 and 14 of the Federal
Rules of Criminal Procedure, 74 YALE LJ. 553 (1965).
188 Where the defendant argues that thejoinder of multiple offenses exceeds the scope of
Rule 8 itsef, severance is much easier to obtain. Misjoinder is a question of law, and is not a
matter of discretion. SeeUnited States v. Lane, 474 U.S. 438,449 n.12 ("review on appeal is
for an error of law"); Werner, 620 F.2d at 926 & n.5; Grane!/o, 365 F.2d 990, 995 (2d Cir.
1966); Turoff, 853 F.2d 1037, 1042 (2d Cir. 1988).
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fenses. In addition, the Guidelines' grouping rules' 8 9 and require-
ments for concurrent sentencing' 90 reduce incentives to fragment
prosecutions. Thus, minimal tinkering with the relevant conduct pro-
vision' 91 should harmonize the Guidelines regime with a mandatory
joinder requirement.
As currently interpreted, the relevant conduct provision allows
consideration of acts which could not be joined under Rule 8.192 This
opens up the possibility that under ajoinder requirement coextensive
with or narrower than Rule 8, facts underlying an offense subse-
quently prosecuted will be litigated twice. Most circuits allow en-
hancements for relevant conduct evidence and a subsequent sentence
for a later conviction based upon that conduct' a93 The chief difficulty
from the successive prosecution perspective is that the government
acquires the proverbial dress rehearsal at sentencing. If a defendant
presents evidence at the sentencing hearing, the prosecution obtains
crucial discovery for the subsequent trial. This practice creates the
possibility that an innocent person will be convicted by a well-choreo-
graphed presentation at the subsequent trial. Revising the relevant
conduct provision to mirror the scope of any transaction rule would
avoid this problem.
In cases in which the defendant has declined to waive venue, two
problems involving the application of the relevant conduct provision
could occur. First, allowing enhancement at sentencing in the initial
proceeding for an offense without venue would give rise to all of the
successive prosecution problems discussed in the preceding para-
graph. The easiest way to handle this issue is to prohibit relevant con-
duct enhancements for acts forming the underlying basis of a pending
charge.
The second problem is more complex. The government may
simply dismiss charges in response to a defendant's decision not to
waive venue and seek enhancement at sentencing, rather than refile
the indictment in the appropriate district. From a successive prosecu-
tion standpoint, this would be a positive development. But in such a
case, the defendant loses forever the right to have a jury review the
accusation. The Guidelines already obstruct public review of punish-
189 See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 3D1.2. See also supra note 135 and accompanying text.
190 See U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 5G1.3. See also supra notes 83 to 84 and accompanying
text.
191 U.S.S.G., supra note 5, § 1B1.3. See also supra notes 78 to 81 and accompanying text.
192 See Wilkins & Steer, supra note 79, at 515-16; see supra text accompanying note 79.
193 See supra text accompanying note 82. Both the Second and Tenth Circuits, however,
have barred the subsequent prosecution of offenses offered as relevant conduct in the first
proceeding on Double Jeopardy grounds. See United States v. McCormick, 992 F.2d 437
(2d Cir. 1993); United States v. Koonce, 945 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1991).
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ment decisions by encouraging prosecutors to forego formal convic-
tions in favor of sentence enhancements.1 9 4 A compulsory joinder
rule should avoid contributing to this trend. Prohibiting relevant con-
duct enhancements for dismissed charges in the venue waiver context
provides a simple solution to the dilemma.
F. COMPLEX/COMPOUND OFFENSES
The ever expanding use of complex/compound offenses to at-
tack remote or continuing behavior further complicates any compul-
soryjoinder effort in the federal system. Prosecutions for conspiracy,
RICO, and violations of other complex/compound offenses, such as
Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE), 195 will require specialjoinder
rules tailored to the specific offense at issue. Although any in depth
consideration is beyond the scope of this Article, some general obser-
vations are appropriate.
If a true "transaction" rule is embraced, some of the rules devel-
oped for conspiracy in the double jeopardy context provide a logical
starting point In determining whether separate prosecutions of re-
lated conspiracies involve the same offense, courts have used the "to-
tality of circumstances" approach. This test focuses on fa~tors such as
"the overlap in time, personnel, and geographic location; the similar-
ity of the overt acts; and the defendant's role in the two conspiracies,"
and might also include the "statutory offenses involved,... common
objectives and the degree of interdependence between the two con-
spiracies."196 Although this technique undoubtedly allows prosecu-
tors to dissect larger conspiracies into several smaller units, such
problems seem almost unavoidable due to the multi-defendant nature
of the crime.
Other double jeopardy innovations are less justifiable. Conspir-
acy prosecutions require proof of overt acts which are often them-
selves criminal offenses. The courts have routinely held that
conspiracy and the substantive offenses committed in the furtherance
of the conspiracy do not need to be tried together.197 An across the
194 See Freed, supra note 79, at 1714 ("[Relevant conduct] allows the prosecutor to in-
crease an offender's sentence more easily by dropping charges than by bringing them");
Lear, supra note 78, at 1206 (1993) ("Even when the Guidelines authorize a less severe
punishment for an offense in the absence of a conviction, a prosecutor still has a substan-
tial incentive to withhold proof until sentencing.").
195 21 U.S.C. § 848 (1988).
196 Poulin, supra note 63, at 119 (footnotes omitted).
197 See United States v. Felix, 112 S. Ct. 1377, 1384 (choosing to apply the established
rule "long antedating any of [the recent] cases, and not questioned in any of them... that
a substantive crime, and a conspiracy to commit that crime, are not the 'same offense' for
double jeopardy purposes").
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board rule allowing the substantive offenses to be tried separately
from the conspiracy is surely the height of inefficiency. In many cases,
co-conspirators can be tried in one proceeding for the substantive
crimes and the conspiracy itself, without generating too much confu-
sion. Prosecutors should be required to include substantive offenses
in the conspiracy indictment, and deal with potential confusion
through severance.
RICO prosecutions require a more intricate analysis, and many
commentators have offered thoughtful solutions to the successive
prosecution dilemma in the RICO context.198 It may be that no single
solution will sufficiently address the myriad of ways in which a related
prosecution may be generated in the RICO environment. Rules must
be developed to cover, at the very least, successive RICO prosecutions,
the prosecution of the predicate acts followed by a RICO indictment,
a RICO prosecution followed by separate indictments for the predi-
cate acts alleged, and the successive prosecution of RICO and other
complex offenses such as CCE. Professor Poulin analyzes these
problems in the constitutional context and concludes that a combina-
tion of the totality of circumstances test used in conspiracy cases and
the Grady test would "give prosecutors adequate latitude while protect-
ing defendants' interests." 199 Such a formula provides a reasonable
point at which to begin debate regarding a statutory joinder require-
ment in the complex/compound offense category.
V. CONCLUSION
Successive prosecution in the federal system presents a particu-
larly difficult puzzle. Decentralized structure, constitutional venue
limitations, political agendas, and the innate complexity of federal of-
fenses make a solution that much more perplexing. Yet, regardless of
its origins, federal reprosecution is a dangerous phenomenon, pro-
ceeding virtually unchecked with the power to ruin defendants and
undermine the integrity of the criminal justice system.
Neither the inherent uncertainty of a factually-driven joinder re-
quirement nor the need to remedy unpopular verdicts sufficientlyjus-
tifies the retention of an unchecked reprosecution power in the
federal system. However, reaching a political consensus on this point
and agreeing on a workable transaction definition are but the tip of
the iceberg. Implementing a compulsory joinder regime will require
intricate policy choices about the way federal prosecutors do business,
the role of the courts in evaluating prosecutorial judgments, sentenc-
198 See, e.g., Poulin, supra note 63; Thomas, supra note 67, at 1359.
199 Poulin, supra note 63, at 136.
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ing policy, and a myriad of other questions. Expanding the tradi-
tional transaction rule debate to include such policy considerations
may yield a rule that avoids hamstringing the prosecution, while ade-
quately protecting defendants from government abuse.
